Choices, Values, and Frames / Edition 1

by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky

Overview

Choices, Values, and Frames presents an empirical and theoretical challenge to classical utility theory, offering prospect theory as an alternative framework. Extensions and applications to diverse economic phenomena and to studies of consumer behavior are discussed. The book also elaborates on framing effects and other demonstrations that preferences are constructed in context, and it develops new approaches to the standard view of choice-based utility. As with the classic 1982 volume, Judgment Under Uncertainty, this volume is comprised of papers published in diverse academic journals. The editors have written several new chapters and a preface to provide a context for the work.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521627498
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	09/25/2000
Edition description:	First Edition
Pages:	860
Product dimensions:	6.14(w) x 9.29(h) x 1.34(d)

About the Author

Daniel Kahneman is Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology Emeritus at Princeton University and a professor of public affairs emeritus at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He received the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his pioneering work with Amos Tversky on decision-making. He is the author of the bestselling book on cognitive psychology Thinking, Fast and Slow which won the National Academy of Sciences Best Book Award in 2012.

Table of Contents

1. Choices, values, and frames; Part I. Prospect Theory and Extensions: 2. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk; 3. Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty; Part II. The Certainty Effect and the Weighting Function: 4. Compound invariant weighting function in prospect theory; 5. Weighing risk and uncertainty; 6. A belief-based account of decision under uncertainty; Part III. Loss Aversion and the Value Function: 7. Loss aversion in riskless choice: a reference-dependent model; 8. Anomalies: the endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias; 9. The endowment effect and evidence of nonreversible indifference curves; 10. A test of the theory of reference-dependent preferences; Part IV. Framing and Mental Accounting: 11. Rational choice and the framing of decisions; 12. Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions; 13. Mental accounting matters; Part V. Applications: 14. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice; 15. Prospect theory in the wild: evidence from the field; 16. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle; 17. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: entitlements in the market; 18. Money illusion; 19. Labor supply of New York City cab drivers: one day at a time; 20. Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?; 21. Timid choices and bold forecasts: a cognitive perspective on risk taking; 22. Overconfidence and excess entry: an experimental approach; 23. Judicial choice and disparities between measures of economic values; 24. Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice; 25. Conflict resolution: a cognitive perspective; Part VI. The Multiplicity of Value: Reversals of Preference: 26. The construction of preference; 27. Contingent weighting in judgment and choice; 28. Context-dependent preferences; 29. Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance; 30. The evaluability hypothesis: explaining joint-separate preference reversals and beyond; Part VII. Choice over Time: 31. Preferences for sequences of outcomes; 32. Anomalies in intertemporal choice: evidence and an interpretation; Part VIII. Alternative Conceptions of Value: 33. Reason-based choice; 34. Value elicitation: is there anything in there?; 35. Economists have preferences, psychologists have attitudes: an analysis of dollar responses to public issues; Part IX. Experienced Utility: 36. Endowments and contrast in judgments of well-being; 37. A bias in the prediction of tastes; 38. The effect of purchase quantity and timing on variety-seeking behavior; 39. Back to Bentham? Explorations of expereiences utility; 40. New challenges to the rationality assumption.

Editorial Reviews

"Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos Tversky have started a new perspective on the traditional economic categories of choice, decision, and value. A series of experimental and empirical studies by them and others have rejected traditional economic assumptions of rationality. Even more importantly, these scholars have developed alternative generalizations with significant predictive power and have found empirical verification for them. This outstanding collection of studies will make these new results widely accessible." Kenneth J. Arrow, Joan Kenney Professor of Economics, Emeritus and Professor of Operations Research, Emeritus, Stanford University

From the Publisher