This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.
|Publisher:||Princeton University Press|
|Product dimensions:||7.75(w) x 10.00(h) x (d)|
About the Author
Lisa L. Martin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Harvard University.
Table of ContentsFigures
Pt. 1 Theory and Data
2 Model and Hypotheses
3 Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables
4 Estimating Models of Cooperation
Pt. 2 Case Studies
5 Human Rights in Latin America: Explaining Unilateral U.S. Sanctions
6 The Falkland Islands Conflict
7 Western Technology-Export Controls
8 The Polish Crisis and Gas-Pipeline Sanctions