This book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term contracts and the efficiency of electricity markets. These include the impact of long-term contracts and vertical integration on effective competition, generation investment in risky markets, and the challenges for competition policy principles.
On the one hand, long-term contracts may contribute to lasting generation capability by allowing for a more efficient allocation of risk. On the other hand, they can create conditions for imperfect competition and thus impair short-term efficiency. The contributors – prominent academics and policy experts with inter-disciplinary perspectives – develop fresh theoretical and practical insights on this important concern for current electricity markets.
This highly accessible book will strongly appeal to both academic and professional audiences including scholars of industrial, organizational and public sector economics, and competition and antitrust law. It will also be of value to regulatory and antitrust authorities, governmental policymakers, and consultants in electricity law and economics.
|Publisher:||Elgar, Edward Publishing, Inc.|
|Series:||The Loyola de Palacio Series on European Energy Policy Series|
|Product dimensions:||6.40(w) x 9.30(h) x 0.90(d)|
About the Author
Edited by Jean-Michel Glachant, Holder of the Loyola de Palacio Chair on EU Energy Policy and Director, Florence School of Regulation, European University Institute, Italy, Dominique Finon, Directeur de Recherche CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement, CNRS and EHESS, Paris, France and Adrien de Hauteclocque, Référendaire, Court of Justice of the European Union, Luxembourg
Table of Contents
Dominique Finon, Jean-Michel Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque
PART I: LONG-TERM CONTRACTS, INVESTMENT AND LONG-TERM EFFICIENCY
1. Energy Security and Long-term Arrangements
Jacqueline Boucher and Yves Smeers
2. Long-term Contracts and Technology Choices in Electricity Markets
Fabien A. Roques
3. Investment and Competition in Decentralized Electricity Markets: How to Overcome Market Failure by Market Imperfections?
4. Comparison of Long-term Contracts and Vertical Integration in Decentralized Electricity Markets
Richard Meade and Seini O’Connor
5. Vertical Relations and Energy Networks: Selected Issues
PART II: LONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION
6. Imperfect Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Some Lessons from Theoretical Models
7. Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Long-term Contracting and Risk Management from the Point of View of a Large Consumer
8. Competition and Long-term Contracts in the Dutch Electricity Market
PART III: COMPETITION POLICY AND LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
9. Long-term Contracts and Competition Policy in European Energy Markets
Adrien de Hauteclocque and Jean-Michel Glachant
10. Long-term Contracts and State Aid: A New Application of the EU State Aid Regime or a Special Case?
11. The Essential Facilities Doctrine in European Competition Policy: The Case of the Energy Sector
Adrien de Hauteclocque, Frédéric Marty and Julien Pillot
PART IV: CONCLUSION
12. Efficiency, Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Summary and Conclusions of the Workshop Organized by the GIS LARSEN and the Loyola de Palacio Program of the European University Institute, Florence, 15–16 January 2009
Adrien de Hauteclocque