The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations.
This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|Series:||Oxford Cognitive Science Series|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||9.10(w) x 6.10(h) x 0.50(d)|
|Lexile:||1210L (what's this?)|
Table of Contents
1. Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory.
2. Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be.
3. The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale.
4. The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale.
5. Prototypes and Compositionality. (Appendix 5A: Meaning Postulates. Appendix 5B: The 'Theory Theory' of Concepts.)
6. Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument. (Appendix 6A: Similarity.)
7. Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Intentional Laws and Natural Kinds. (Appendix 7A: Round Squares.)