Close competition for majority party control of the U.S. House of Representatives has transformed the congressional parties from legislative coalitions into partisan fundraising machines. With the need for ever increasing sums of money to fuel the ongoing campaign for majority control, both Republicans and Democrats have made large donations to the party and its candidates mandatory for members seeking advancement within party and congressional committee hierarchies.
Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson not only analyze this development, but also discuss its implications for American government and democracy. They address the consequences of selecting congressional leaders on the basis of their fundraising skills rather than their legislative capacity and the extent to which the battle for majority control leads Congress to prioritize short-term electoral gains over long-term governing and problem-solving.
|Publisher:||University of Michigan Press|
|Product dimensions:||8.90(w) x 6.00(h) x 1.00(d)|
About the Author
Eric S. Heberlig is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
Bruce A. Larson is Associate Professor of Political Science at Gettysburg College.
Table of Contents
Preface ix 1 Introduction 1
2 Parties, Incumbents, and Campaign Finance in American Politics 22
3 Majority Status and Institutional Power 60
4 The Growth of Member Giving 95
5 Brother, Can You Spare a Thousand? Who Gives to Whom? 135
6 Getting Ahead by Giving a Lot: Party Goals and Advancement in the House 159
7 Leveraging Funds to Pay for the New Party Fundraising Expectations 197
8 Redistribution and the Value of a House Career 221
9 Beyond Legislating 246