ISBN-10:
0470591803
ISBN-13:
9780470591802
Pub. Date:
11/15/2010
Publisher:
Wiley
Contemporary Industrial Organization: A Quantitative Approach / Edition 1

Contemporary Industrial Organization: A Quantitative Approach / Edition 1

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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780470591802
Publisher: Wiley
Publication date: 11/15/2010
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 576
Product dimensions: 7.30(w) x 10.00(h) x 1.00(d)

Table of Contents

About the Authors.

Preface.

PART I MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS.

1 Industrial Organization and Imperfect Competition: What,How, and Why?

1.1 What Is Industrial Organization?

1.2 How We Analyze Imperfect Competition.

1.3 Why: Antitrust Policy and Industrial OrganizationTheory.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

Appendix–Excerpts from Key Antitrust Statutes.

2 Basic Microeconomics.

2.1 Competition versus Monopoly: The Poles of MarketPerformance.

2.2 Intertemporal Considerations and Constraints on MonopolyPower.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

3 Technology and Cost Relationships.

3.1 Production Technology and Cost Function for Single-ProductFirms.

3.2 Cost Relations for Multiproduct Firms.

3.3 Non-Cost Determinants of Market Structure.

3.4 Empirical Application: Cost Function Estimation, Scale andScope Economies.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

4 Market Structure and Market Power.

4.1 Measuring Market Structure.

4.2 Measuring Market power—the Lerner Index Again.

4.3 Empirical Application: Monopoly Power: How Bad Is It?

Summary.

Problems.

References.

PART II PRICE AND NONPRICE TACTICS FOR FIRMS WITH MARKETPOWER.

5 Price Discrimination and Monopoly.

5.1 The Feasibility of Price Discrimination.

5.2 First-Degree Price Discrimination.

5.3 Price Discrimination with Less Information.

5.4 Second-Degree Price Discrimination: Menu Pricing.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

6 Price Discrimination, Product Variety, Bundling &Tying.

6.1 Price Discrimination and Product Quality.

6.2 Price Discrimination and Product Variety.

6.3 Bundling and Tying.

6.4 Empirical Application: Price Discrimination, ProductVariety, and Monopoly versus Competition.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

PART III OLIGOPOLY AND STRATEGIC INTERACTION.

7 Static Games and Quantity versus Price Competition.

7.1 A Brief Introduction to Game Theory.

7.2 Dominant and Dominated Strategies.

7.3 The Static Cournot Model.

7.4 The Bertrand Model.

7.5 Strategic Substitutes and Complements.

7.6 Empirical Application: Brand Competition and ConsumerPreferences—Evidence from the California Retail GasolineMarket.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

8 Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers.

8.1 The Stackelberg Model of Quantity Competition.

8.2 Sequential Price Competition

8.3 Sequential Quality Choice.

8.4 Commitment and Credibility in Dynamic Games.

8.5 The Chain-Store Paradox.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

9 Entry Deterrence and Predation.

9.1 Market Structure over Time; Random Process & StylizedFacts.

9.2 Deterring Entry.

9.3 Predation and Asymmetric Information.

9.4 Long-Term Contracts as a Barrier to Entry.

9.5 Predatory Conduct and Public Policy.

9.6 Empirical Application: Entry Deterrence in thePharmaceutical Industry.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

10 Price Fixing and Repeated Games.

10.1 The Cartel's Dilemma.

10.2 Repeated Games.

10.3 Empirical Application 1: Estimating the Effects ofPrice-Fixing.

10.4 Cartels in Practice: Facilitating Factors andPractices.

10.5 Antitrust Policy toward Cartels; Deterrence andDetection.

10.6 Empirical Application: An Experimental Investigation ofLeniency Programs.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

PART IV CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS.

11 Horizontal Mergers.

11.1 Horizontal Mergers and the Merger Paradox.

11.2 Mergers and Cost Synergies.

11.3 Merged Firms as Stackelberg Leaders.

11.4 Sequential Mergers.

11.5 Horizontal Mergers and Product Differentiation.

11.6 Public Policy and Horizontal Mergers.

11.7 Application: Evaluating the Impact of Mergers with ComputerSimulation.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

12 Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers.

12.1 Procompetitive Vertical Mergers.

12.2 Vertical Mergers, Price Discrimination, andCompetition.

12.3 Vertical Mergers, Oligopoly, and Foreclosure.

12.4 A Reappraisal: The GE-Honeywell Merger Once More.

12.5 A Note on Conglomerate Mergers.

12.6 Empirical Application: Vertical Integration in theReady-Mixed Concrete Industry.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

13 Vertical Restraints.

13.1 Vertical Price Restraints and Antitrust Policy: A BriefHistory.

13.2 Vertical Price Restraints and Suppressed Competition.

13.3 Arguments in Support of Vertical Price Restraints.

13.4 Retail Price Maintenance and Uncertain Demand.

13.5 Nonprice Vertical Restraints.

13.6 Aftermarkets.

13.7 Empirical Application: Exclusive Dealing in the U.S. BeerIndustry.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

PART V TOPICS IN NONPRICE COMPETITION: ADVERTISING ANDRESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

14 Advertising, Market Power, and Information.

14.1 Advertising and Monopoly Power: The Dorfman-SteinerCondition.

14.2 Advertising as Consumer Information.

14.3 Advertising, Information, and Competition.

14.4 Complements, Advertising, and Brand Names.

14.5 Empirical Application: Advertising, Information, andPrestige.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

15 Research and Development.

15.1 A Taxonomy of Innovations.

15.2 Market Structure and the Incentive to Innovate.

15.3 A More Complete Model of Competition and Innovation.

15.4 Evidence on the Schumpeterian Hypothesis.

15.5 Product and Process Innovation: Cournot versusBertrand.

15.6 R&D Cooperation between Firms.

15.7 Empirical Application: R&D Spillovers in Practice.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

16 Patents and Patent Policy.

16.1 Optimal Patent Length.

16.2 Optimal Patent Breadth.

16.3 Patent Races.

16.4 Monopoly Power and “Sleeping Patents.”

16.5 Patent Licensing.

16.6 Recent Patent Policy Developments.

16.7 Empirical Application: Patent Law and Patent Practice inthe Semiconductor Industry.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

PART VI SPECIAL TOPICS: NETWORKS AND STRATEGIC TRADEPOLICY.

17 Network Markets.

17.1 Market Provision of a Network Service.

17.2 Networks, Competition, and Complementary Services.

17.3 Systems Competition and the Battle over IndustryStandards.

17.4 Application: Network Externalities in ComputerSoftware—Spreadsheets.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

18 Strategic Commitments: Confronting Potential Entrants andInternational Rivalry.

18.1 The Strategic Value of Commitment.

18.2 Strategic Complements and Substitutes: Cats, Dogs, and theLean and Hungry Look.

18.3 Strategic Commitments in International Markets.

18.4 Trade Agreements and Commitment Devices.

Summary.

Problems.

References.

Answers to Selected Problems.

Index.

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