Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of Marketization: How Shareholders gained Control Rights in Britain, Germany, and France

by Helen Callaghan

Overview

Since the early 1980s, governments worldwide have taken many measures to expand the role of markets. Recent political events reflect widespread disenchantment with neoliberal policies, but it remains doubtful whether populist leaders will deliver the market restraints that many of their voters expect. This book explains the resilience of marketization processes by highlighting the role of profiteers- namely those who, like the organizer of a cock fight, benefit from contests regardless of who wins. By setting up shop on the sidelines, profiteers accumulate resources that boost political efforts to maintain and expand the arena of competition. Evidence comes from the evolution of support for shareholder rights relating to takeover bids among key interest groups and political parties in three countries since the late nineteenth century.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780192548030
Publisher:	OUP Oxford
Publication date:	01/19/2018
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	224
File size:	503 KB

About the Author

Helen Callaghan is a senior research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. She studied Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) at the University of Oxford, obtained her Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and enjoyed a Max Weber Fellowship at the European University Institute before joining the MPIfG. Her research focuses on the politics of corporate governance in advanced industrialized economies. She has published peer reviewed articles in Comparative Political Studies, Comparative European Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, Review of International Political Economy, Socio-Economic Review, and West European Politics.

Table of Contents

• Contents
• Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• 1: Introduction
• 1.1: The Puzzle: Market Liberalization Across Advanced Capitalist Democracies
• 1.2: Analytic Focus: Policy Feedback Processes
• 1.3: The Argument
• 1.4: Research Operationalization
• 1.5: Case Selection
• 1.6: Epistemology, Ontology, and Method
• 1.7: Outline
• 2: The Political Dynamics of Marketizing Corporate Control
• 2.1: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Regulatory Challenge
• 2.2: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Political Process
• 2.3: Economic Dynamics of the Market for Corporate Control
• 2.4: Economic Dynamism and Political Salience
• 2.5: Summary
• 3: Britain
• 3.1: The Prewar and Interwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
• Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?
• 3.2: Turning Point after the Second World War: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids
• Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
• 3.3: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules
• Puzzle 3: Why did pro-market groups prevail?
• 3.4: Summary
• 4.: Germany
• 4.1: The Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
• 4.2: Turning Point in the 1990s: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids
• Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?
• Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
• 4.3: Summary
• 5: France
• 5.1: Prewar, Interwar and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
• Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?
• 5.2: First Turning Point After the Second World War: State Supervision of Incumbents
• 5.3: Second Turning Point in the late 1960s: Steps Toward Marketization
• Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
• 5.4: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules
• 5.5: Summary
• 6: Conclusion
• 6.1: Findings
• 6.2: Generalizability
• 6.3: Alternative Explanations
• 6.4: Value Added to Previous Research in the Same Empirical Domain
• 6.5: Broader Theoretical Significance
• Bibliography