Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

ISBN-10:
0521680468
ISBN-13:
9780521680462
Pub. Date:
09/30/2006
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
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Overview

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

  • A comprehensive discussion of delegation and principal-agent theory in international relations
  • Includes 12 empirically orientated chapters covering a broad range of the most important international organisations in the world today
  • Draws explicit links between international relations and economics, comparative politics and American politics

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780521680462
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 09/30/2006
Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 426
Product dimensions: 5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.94(d)

Table of Contents

Part I. Introduction: 1. Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney; Part II. Variation in Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, and Private Benefits: 2. A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney; 3. US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes; 4. Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems Helen V. Milner; 5. Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality Lisa L. Martin; 6. Delegation and discretion in the European Union Mark A. Pollack; Part III. Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability: 7. How agents matter Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby; 8. Screening power: international organizations as informative agents Alexander Thompson; 9. Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson; 10. Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity Erica R. Gould; 11. Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power Karen J. Alter; Part IV. Directions for Future Research: 12. The logic of delegation to international organizations David A. Lake and Mathew McCubbins.

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