Overview
Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations is another in the Combat Studies Institute’s (CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Papers series. The impetus for this series that concerns topics relevant to ongoing and future operations came from the Commanding General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, V Corps commander in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, directed CSI to examine historical topics that would benefit American and coalition soldiers and planners in both Iraq today, and in the broader GWOT spectrum now and in the future. One of those topics was the transition from combat (Phase III) operations to stability (Phase IV) operations, to use the current phasing construct familiar to campaign planners. Mr. David Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and current CSI historian, has produced a study that examines nine critical factors that should be addressed in stabilization planning and execution. Mr. Cavaleri then presents a case study of the US occupation of Japan after World War II, followed by a parallel analysis of the case study and ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq through the lens of the critical planning factors.
This study cautions against the misuse and overuse of “lessons” learned from historical case studies. Yet, the critical analysis of operations using relatively timeless planning factors has proven to be a valuable tool to aid our understanding of where we are and where we are going. The Japan of 1945 is not the Japan of today, much less the Iraq of tomorrow; however, the contemporary problems faced by military and civilian planners remain very similar. Stability operations are with us now and for the foreseeable future. For the professional officer and campaign planner, then, it is instructive to revisit prior US experience in this critical arena.
