Fact, Fiction, and Forecast: Fourth Edition

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast: Fourth Edition

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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780674290716
Publisher: Harvard
Publication date: 03/07/1983
Edition description: Fourth Edition
Pages: 160
Sales rank: 743,946
Product dimensions: 5.25(w) x 7.94(h) x (d)

About the Author

Nelson Goodman is Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at Harvard University.

Hilary Putnam was Cogan University Professor, Emeritus, at Harvard University.

Table of Contents

Foreword To The Fourth Edition

by Hilary Putnam

What People are Saying About This

Quire possibly the best book by a philosopher in the last twenty years. It changed, probably permanently, the way we think about the problem of induction, and hence about a constellation of related problems like learning and the nature of rational decision. This is the work of contemporary philosophy that I would most like to hove written.

J. A. Fodor

Quire possibly the best book by a philosopher in the last twenty years. It changed, probably permanently, the way we think about the problem of induction, and hence about a constellation of related problems like learning and the nature of rational decision. This is the work of contemporary philosophy that I would most like to hove written.

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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast: Fourth Edition 5 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 1 reviews.
Guest More than 1 year ago
This book is clearly written and undeniably rigorous. In his first chapters, Goodman examines problems in counterfactual conditionals and sets up the problem of what he calls 'projectibility'. But, it is the chapter entitled "The New Riddle of Induction" where the book takes off. In this chapter, Goodman takes the reader through, first, the common misconceptions of the problem of induction. The way that Goodman perceives our inductive system is unique and refreshingly simplistic. (John Rawls later names Goodman's picture 'reflective equilibrium'.) Next, Goodman takes you through a journey of rule-finding for our inductive system; which includes examining Hempel's famous Raven's Paradox. Goodman ends the journey with discovering his own paradox, which he calls his 'Grue' argument. He demonstrates that predicates like 'grue' are the lingering problem with constructing a valid inductive system. In his last chapter, Goodman attempts to resolve the grue dilemma. It is in this chapter that we see the full philosophic mind of Goodman. The depth and relentless thought that Goodman puts into this chapter will forever 'entrench' his name in the philosophic discipline.