With the advent of the Internet and other modern information and communication technologies, a magnificent opportunity has opened up for introducing new, innovative models of commerce, markets, and business. Creating these innovations calls for significant interdisciplinary interaction among researchers in computer science, communication networks, operations research, economics, mathematics, sociology, and management science. In the emerging era of new problems and challenges, one particular tool that has found widespread applications is mechanism design.
The focus of this book is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. It provides a sound foundation of relevant concepts and theory, to help apply mechanism design to problem solving in a rigorous way.
Table of ContentsIntroduction Motivating Problems in Network Economics Mechanism Design Outline of the Monograph
Foundations of Mechanism Design Strategic Form Games Dominant Strategy Equilibria Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Bayesian Games The Mechanism Design Environment Examples of Social Choice Functions Implementation of Social Choice Functions Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem Properties of Social Choice Functions The Gibbard Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem Arrow's Impossibility Theorem The Quasi Linear Environment Groves Mechanisms Clarke (Pivotal) Mechanisms Examples of VCG Mechanisms Bayesian Implementation: The dAGVA Mechanism Bayesian Incentive Compatibility in Linear Environment Revenue Equivalence Theorem Myerson Optimal Auction Further Topics in Mechanism Design To Probe Further
Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions Internet Advertising Sponsored Search Auction Sponsored Search Auction as a Mechanism Design Problem Generalized First Price (GFP) Mechanism Generalized Second Price (GSP) Mechanism Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism Optimal (OPT) Mechanism Comparison of GSP, VCG, and OPT Mechanisms Individual Rationality Computational Complexity Summary and Future Work Related Literature
Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing Grid Computing The Model The G-DSIC Mechanism The G-BIC Mechanism G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism Current Art and Future Perspective
Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Introduction to Ad hoc Wireless Networks Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol DSIC-B Protocol versus BIC-B Protocol: A Discussion Conclusions and Future Work
To Probe Further Topics in Mechanism Design Key Application Areas In Conclusion
What People are Saying About This
“This book is a very interesting and useful book by Springer for people working in the important and fast growing discipline of mechanism design an area in which a good number of academics have received Noble Prizes. It is one of the best books in the game theory and mechanism design areas. ... It however can be used as a very suitable textbook/second textbook for several courses ... . This book deserves wide publicity both as a textbook and a research book as it will provide great benefits to a large academic community in the specified areas of the book.” (Prof.
Sardar M. N. Islam, Ph.D.,
LL.B., College of Business, Victoria University, Australia)