This edited volume is an outcome of the first major collaborative project between Japanese economists and political scientists, funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. The authors of the individual chapters show that Asian states play games of conflict and cooperation strategically by creating, changing, or destroying institutions. For them, conflict and cooperation are inseparable phenomena and are integral parts of states’ strategic interactions under constraints. Through the establishment of appropriate institutions that coordinate states’ actions, present conflict can be turned into stable cooperation in the future.
No discernible difference exists in the extent of rationality between the East and the West, but substantial variations between regions or even within a region are found in institutions that are influenced by history and culture. Historical and cultural variations divide contemporary Asia, making regional institutional cooperation difficult and prompting some Asian states to use global or inter-regional arrangements in order to obtain benefits of cooperation.
Qualifications are provided for this line of argument in the first chapter, which also discusses the affinity of international relations theory and game theory, with special attention to Japan and Asia. The following ten substantive chapters are developed based on the conceptual framework and, for integrity and coherence, are sub-grouped into four parts that correspond to major issues in international relations scholarship: (1) conflict management, (2) arms control, (3) trade, and (4) currency.
About the Author
Motoshi Suzuki is a professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University. His Ph.D. in international studies was conferred by the University of South Carolina. Before joining Kyoto University in 2002, he taught at Kwansei Gakuin University and the University of North Texas and also served as a visiting professor of the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo and a program officer of the Research Promotion Bureau in the Ministry of Education. Dr. Suzuki has published articles in major international journals, including American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, European Journal of Political Research, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Politics, and Public Choice. His most recent book, Globalization and the Politics of Institutional Reform in Japan, was published by Edward Elgar in 2016. His current research interests lie in international political economy in the Asia-Pacific and Japanese political economy.
Akira Okada is a professor at the Institute of Economic Research in Kyoto University. He received his B.A. in 1977 and his Ph.D. in 1982, both from Tokyo Institute of Technology. He has taught game theory at Tokyo Institute of Technology, Saitama University, Kyoto University, and Hitotsubashi University. Dr. Okada has served as associate editor of International Journal of Game Theory, Mathematical Social Sciences, and International Journal of Economic Theory, and as the editor-in-chief of Japanese Economic Review. He acted as the president of the Japanese Economic Association in 2014−2015. He has visited several academic institutions, including Northwestern University, the University of Bielefeld (ZiF), the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in Vienna, and the University of Bonn. Akira Okada’s research fields are game theory, bargaining theory, public choice, microeconomics, and experimental economics. In particular, he has investigated economic behavior and social order in human society using mathematical and experimental methodologies of game theory. He is currently working on various cooperative mechanisms such as group formation, bargaining, contract, institutions, and evolution through which goal-seeking interdependent agents can improve their welfare, overcoming conflicts. He has published many articles on game theory and its applications in academic journals such as American Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, and Journal of Economic Theory.
Table of Contents
1 A Strategic Approch to the Study of International Relations in Asia (Motoshi Suzuki).- Part I. Security Cooperation and Conflict Management.- 2 A Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense in the US-Japan Alliance (Shuhei Kurizaki).- 3 Information Sharing in Early Stage International Disputes: How China and Japan Communicate (Shoko Kohama, Atsushi Tago, and Kazunori Inamasu).- 4 Peacekeeping by the UN and Regional Organizations: Sharing the Burden or Passing the Buck? (Yukari Iwanami).- 5 Politics over the Claim of Individual Self-Defense at Wars: Aid Conditionality and Reciprocity in Asian Regional Conflict (Atsushi Tago).- Part II. Security Cooperation and Arms Control.- 6 International Cooperation and Institution Formation: A Game Theoretic Perspective (Akira Okada).- 7 An Agenda-Setting Game of the Landmine Ban Treaty (Hikaru Hayashi).- Part III. Trade Cooperation.- 8 FTA/EPA Negotiations and Domestic Reforms in Two-Level Games Analysis (Kaoru Ishiguro).- 9 The Paradox of Compliance: Does Legalization Increase Compliance in Trade Disputes? (Keisuke Iida).- Part IV. Currency Cooperation.- 10 Analyzing International Developmental Loan Markets with Rival Lenders (Motoshi Suzuki, Keisuke Iida, and Shohei Doi).- 11 Globalism and Regionalism: The East Asian Currency Crisis and Institutional Building (Motoshi Suzuki).- Index.