This second volume of a two-part series examines three major topics. First, it devotes five chapters to the classical issue of capital structure choice. Second, it focuses on the value-implications of major corporate investment and restructuring decisions, and then concludes by surveying the role of pay-for-performance type executive compensation contracts on managerial incentives and risk-taking behavior.
In collaboration with the first volume, this handbook takes stock of the main empirical findings to date across an unprecedented spectrum of corporate finance issues. The surveys are written by leading empirical researchers that remain active in their respective areas of interest. With few exceptions, the writing style makes the chapters accessible to industry practitioners. For doctoral students and seasoned academics, the surveys offer dense roadmaps into the empirical research landscape and provide suggestions for future work.
- Nine original chapters summarize research advances and future topics in the classical issues of capital structure choice, corporate investment behavior, and firm value
- Multinational comparisons underline the volume's empirical perspectives
- Complements the presentation of econometric issues, banking, and capital acquisition research covered by Volume 1
About the Author
Table of ContentsPart 3
Dividends, Capital Structure, and Financial Distress
Takeovers, Restructurings, and Managerial Incentives