In this detailed study, Christopher Norris defends the kinds of arguments advanced by the early realist, Hilary Putnam. Norris makes a point of placing Putnam's work in a wider philosophical context, and relating it to various current debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. Much like Putnam, Norris is willing to take full account of opposed viewpoints while maintaining a vigorously argued commitment to the values of debate and enquiry.
|Publisher:||Manchester University Press|
|Product dimensions:||6.30(w) x 9.32(h) x 0.86(d)|
About the Author
Christopher Norris is Distinguished Research Professor in Philosophy at the University of Cardiff, Wales.
Table of Contents
|1||Realism, scepticism and naturalism: stages on the Putnam road||8|
|2||Realism, reference and truth: the problem with quantum mechanics||40|
|3||Squaring with Wittgenstein: versions of 'realism' in Putnam's later philosophy||71|
|4||Can realism be naturalised? Putnam on sense, commonsense and the senses||104|
|5||How many positrons make five? science, scepticism and the 'ready-made world'||135|
|6||The 'many faces' of realism: Reference, meaning and theory-change||167|
|7||Is logic revisable? Putnam, Quine and 'contextual apriority'||192|
|8||The Platonist fix: why 'nothing works' (according to Putnam) in philosophy of mathematics||218|
|9||Putnam, Peano and the malin genie: could we possibly be wrong about elementary number-theory?||246|
|Index of Names||274|