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How to Do Things with Words: Second Edition / Edition 2

How to Do Things with Words: Second Edition / Edition 2

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John L. Austin was one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century. The William James Lectures presented Austin’s conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts on a wide variety of philosophical problems. These talks became the classic How to Do Things with Words.

For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin’s original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary. Students will find the new text clearer, and, at the same time, more faithful to the actual lectures. An appendix contains literal transcriptions of a number of marginal notes made by Austin but not included in the text. Comparison of the text with these annotations provides new dimensions to the study of Austin’s work.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780674411524
Publisher: Harvard
Publication date: 04/15/1975
Series: The William James Lectures , #5
Edition description: Second Edition
Pages: 192
Sales rank: 588,191
Product dimensions: 4.90(w) x 7.20(h) x 0.60(d)

About the Author

J. L. Austin was a British philosopher of language.

Table of Contents

  • Lecture I
  • Lecture II
  • Lecture III
  • Lecture IV
  • Lecture V
  • Lecture VI
  • Lecture VII
  • Lecture VIII
  • Lecture IX
  • Lecture X
  • Lecture XI
  • Lecture XII

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How to Do Things with Words 3.6 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 7 reviews.
jpsnow on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
I cannot recall a more boring book. As short as it was, I still struggled to get through it. It is about the philosophy of language. Austin develops a construct around "performatives." I get that this work was a step in the development of language, helping to cut off an inane trend toward impracticality (all sentences are statements). I didn't really need to read this though.
elenchus on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
It's worth noting the title is a pun.Austin examines when a speech act is performative and not merely constative: when the 'saying' evokes or conjures rather than (merely) states or describes, and is itself an activity (not merely in the trivial sense of flexing vocal cords, etc). Examples such as "I bet", in which case the bet is realised in the saying, rather than the speech act serving merely to report what is happening. Similarly, "I do" (in a wedding ceremony), "I christen this ship", or any number of verdicts such as by a judge or umpire. In short: magick, though of course Austin declines to use any such vocabulary, assuming even that he was familiar with it.Begins by drawing a sharp distinction between constative utterances and performative utterances, for the sake of pursuing his argument. Ends by arguing that all speech acts are always both, preferring then to describe three functions of all speech acts rather than to sort them into discrete categories: locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary (introduced in Lecture VIII).Locutionary has a meaning (and is comprised of phonetic, phatic, rhetic acts). "The bull is going to charge."Illocutionary has a certain force in saying something. Warning someone by stating "The bull is going to charge".Perlocutionary achieves a certain effect in saying something. Persuading someone to cease making noise and waving a red handkerchief by stating "The bull is going to charge".Lecture IV touches on the notion / possibility that all persuasion is essentially coercive; but does not explore this so much as evoke it.Lecture IX links the above to cybernetic causation (signals and responses) as distinct from Newtonian causation (billiard balls).Lecture XI touches on the relevance of truth / falsity of performatives, and in general. "[W]hat we have to study is *not* the sentence but the issuance of an utterance in a speech situation." (139) And issuances are not themselves true / false so much as successful or not, on various criteria. "The truth or falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meaning of words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances." (145)Overall, the approach is analytical in the manner of Robert Dahl in his examination of democratic political theory."But the real conclusion must surely be that we need (a) to distinguish between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and (b) specially and critically to establish with respect to each kind of illocutionary act -- warnings, estimates, verdicts, statements, and descriptions -- what if any is the specific way in which they are intended, first to be in order or not in order, and second, to be 'right' or 'wrong'; what terms of appraisal and disappraisal are used for each and what they mean. This is a wide field and certainly will not lead to a conclusion of 'true' and 'false'; nor will it lead to a distinction of statements from the rest, for stating is only one among very numerous speech acts of the illocutionary class."Furthermore, in general the locutionary act as well as the illocutionary is an abstraction only: every genuine speech act is both." (147)
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