Human Nature and Conduct

Human Nature and Conduct

by John Dewey
4.6 8


View All Available Formats & Editions
Eligible for FREE SHIPPING
  • Get it by Thursday, March 22 ,  Order by 12:00 PM Eastern and choose Expedited Delivery during checkout.


Human Nature and Conduct by John Dewey

John Dewey (1859-1952) is an American philosopher and psychologist most notably remembered for his theories on progressive education. He grew up in the rapidly industrializing town of Burlington, Vermont, where he was able to witness increasing social and economic division of the classes. Although he displayed little vivacity or imagination as a child, he was immensely analytical and spent years teaching and writing on a wide range of philosophical ideas. Of his twenty-one books and countless articles, "Human Nature and Conduct" is one of his best-known; it draws from Dewey's West Memorial Foundation lectures at Stanford University. This work criticizes the morality of the past as being too abstract and reliant on arbitrary rules rather than on a scientific understanding of human nature. Dewey argues that truth changes over time, and therefore life must be based on human experiences and utilizing one's knowledge in coping with those experiences.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781420944044
Publisher: Neeland Media
Publication date: 04/11/2012
Pages: 130
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.31(d)

About the Author

Murray G. Murphey is Professor of Amer­ican Civilization at the University of Penn­sylvania.

Jo Ann Boydston is Director of the Cen­ter for Dewey Studies at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

Patricia Baysinger, textual editor of this volume, is a member of the Dewey Center staff.

Read an Excerpt

Human Nature and Conduct

By John Dewey

Dover Publications, Inc.

Copyright © 2002 Dover Publications, Inc.
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-486-14344-6


HABITS may be profitably compared to physiological functions, like breathing, digesting. The latter are, to be sure, involuntary, while habits are acquired. But important as is this difference for many purposes it should not conceal the fact that habits are like functions in many respects, and especially in requiring the cooperation of organism and environment. Breathing is an affair of the air as truly as of the lungs; digesting an affair of food as truly as of tissues of stomach. Seeing involves light just as certainly as it does the eye and optic nerve. Walking implicates the ground as well as the legs; speech demands physical air and human companionship and audience as well as vocal organs. We may shift from the biological to the mathematical use of the word function, and say that natural operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like speech and honesty, are functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person. They are things done by the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions. The same air that under certain conditions ruffes the pool or wrecks buildings, under other conditions purifies the blood and conveys thought. The outcome depends upon what air acts upon. The social environment acts through native impulses and speech and moral habitudes manifest themselves. There are specific good reasons for the usual attribution of acts to the person from whom they immediately proceed. But to convert this special ref erence into a belief of exclusive ownership is as misleading as to suppose that breathing and digesting are complete within the human body. To get a rational basis for moral discussion we must begin with recognizing that functions and habits are ways of using and incorporating the environment in which the latter has its say as surely as the former.

We may borrow words from a context less technical than that of biology, and convey the same idea by saying that habits are arts. They involve skill of sensory and motor organs, cunning or craft, and objective materials. They assimilate objective energies, and eventuate in command of environment. They require order, discipline, and manifest technique. They have a beginning, middle and end Each stage marks progress in dealing with materials and tools, advance in converting material to active use. We should laugh at any one who said that he was master of stone working, but that the art was cooped up within himself and in no wise dependent upon support from objects and assistance from tools.

In morals we are however quite accustomed to such a fatuity. Moral dispositions are thought of as belonging exclusively to a self. The self is thereby isolated from natural and social surroundings. A whole school of morals flourishes upon capital drawn from restricting morals to character and then separating character from conduct, motives from actual deeds. Recognition of the analogy of moral action with functions and arts uproots the causes which have made morals subjective and "individualistic." It brings morals to earth, and if they still aspire to heaven it is to the heavens of the earth, and not to another world. Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility are not private possessions of a person. They are working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces. All virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective forces. They are interactions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual with elements supplied by the out-door world. They can be studied as objectively as physiological functions, and they can be modified by change of either personal or social elements.

If an individual were alone in the world, he would form his habits (assuming the impossible, namely, that he would be able to form them) in a moral vacuum. They would belong to him alone, or to him only in reference to physical forces. Responsibility and virtue would be his alone. But since habits involve the support of environing conditions, a society or some specific group of fellowmen, is always accessory before and after the fact. Some activity proceeds from a man; then it sets up reactions in the surroundings. Others approve, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and resist. Even letting a man alone is a definite response. Envy, admiration and imitation are complicities. Neutrality is non-existent. Conduct is always shared; this is the difference between it and a physiological process. It is not an ethical "ought" that conduct should be social. It is social, whether bad or good.

Washing one's hands of the guilt of others is a way of sharing guilt so far as it encourages in others a vicious way of action. Non-resistance to evil which takes the form of paying no attention to it is a way of promoting it. The desire of an individual to keep his own conscience stainless by standing aloof from badness may be a sure means of causing evil and thus of creating personal responsibility for it. Yet there are circumstances in which passive resistance may be the most effective form of nullification of wrong action, or in which heaping coals of fire on the evil-doer may be the most effective way of transforming conduct. To sentimentalize over a criminal—to "forgive" because of a glow of feeling—is to incur liability for production of criminals. But to suppose that infliction of retibu-tive suffering suffices, without reference to concrete consequences, is to leave untouched old causes of criminality and to create new ones by fostering revenge and brutality. The abstract theory of justice which demands the "vindication" of law irrespective of instruction and reform of the wrong-doer is as much a refusal to recognize responsibility as is the sentimental gush which makes a suffering victim out of a criminal.

Courses of action which put the blame exclusively on a person as if his evil will were the sole cause of wrong-doing and those which condone offense on account of the share of social conditions in producing bad disposition, are equally ways of making an unreal separation of man from his surroundings, mind from the world. Causes for an act always exist, but causes are not excuses. Questions of causation are physical, not moral except when they concern future consequences. It is as causes of future actions that excuses and accusations alike must be considered. At present we give way to resentful passion, and then "rationalize" our surrender by calling it a vindication of justice. Our entire tradition regarding punitive justice tends to prevent recognition of social partnership in producing crime; it falls in with a belief in metaphysical freewill. By killing an evil-doer or shutting him up behind stone walls, we are enabled to forget both him and our part in creating him. Society excuses itself by laying the blame on the criminal; he retorts by putting the blame on bad early surroundings, the temptations of others, lack of opportunities, and the persecutions of officers of the law. Both are right, except in the wholesale character of their recriminations. But the effect on both sides is to throw the whole matter back into antecedent causation, a method which refuses to bring the matter to truly moral judgment. For morals has to do with acts still within our control, acts still to be performed. No amount of guilt on the part of the evildoer absolves us from responsibility for the consequences upon him and others of our way of treating him, or from our continuing responsibility for the conditions under which persons develop perverse habits.

We need to discriminate between the physical and the moral question. The former concerns what has happened, and how it happened. To consider this question is indispensable to morals. Without an answer to it we cannot tell what forces are at work nor how to direct our actions so as to improve conditions. Until we know the conditions which have helped form the characters we approve and disapprove, our efforts to create the one and do away with the other will be blind and halting. But the moral issue concerns the future. It is prospective. To content ourselves with pronouncing judgments of merit and demerit without reference to the fact that our judgments are themselves facts which have consequences and that their value depends upon their consequences, is complacently to dodge the moral issue, perhaps even to indulge ourselves in pleasurable passion just as the person we condemn once indulged himself. The moral problem is that of modifying the factors which now influence future results. To change the working character or will of another we have to alter objective conditions which enter into his habits. Our own schemes of judgment, of assigning blame and praise, of awarding punishment and honor, are part of these conditions.

In practical life, there are many recognitions of the part played by social factors in generating personal traits. One of them is our habit of making social classifications. We attribute distinctive characteristics to rich and poor, slum-dweller and captain of industry, rustic and suburbanite, officials, politicians, professors, to members of races, sets and parties. These judgments are usually too coarse to be of much use. But they show our practical awareness that personal traits are functions of social situations. When we generalize this perception and act upon it intelligently we are committed by it to recognize that we change character from worse to better only by changing conditions—among which, once more, are our own ways of dealing with the one we judge. We cannot change habit directly: that notion is magic. But we can change it indirectly by modifying conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighting of the objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfilment of desires.

A savage can travel after a fashion in a jungle. Civilized activity is too complex to be carried on without smoothed roads. It requires signals and junction points; traffic authorities and means of easy and rapid transportation. It demands a congenial, antecedently prepared environment. Without it, civilization would relapse into barbarism in spite of the best of subjective intention and internal good disposition. The eternal dignity of labor and art lies in their effecting that permanent reshaping of environment which is the substantial foundation of future security and progress. Individuals flourish and wither away like the grass of the fields. But the fruits of their work endure and make possible the development of further activities having fuller significance. It is of grace not of ourselves that we lead civilized lives. There is sound sense in the old pagan notion that gratitude is the root of all virtue. Loyalty to whatever in the established environment makes a life of excellence possible is the beginning of all progress. The best we can accomplish for posterity is to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning the environment that makes it possible to maintain the habits of decent and refined life. Our individual habits are links in forming the endless chain of humanity. Their significance depends upon the environment inherited from our forerunners, and it is enhanced as we foresee the fruits of our labors in the world in which our successors live.

For however much has been done, there always remains more to do. We can retain and transmit our own heritage only by constant remaking of our own environment. Piety to the past is not for its own sake nor for the sake of the past, but for the sake of a present so secure and enriched that it will create a yet better future. Individuals with their exhortations, their preachings and scoldings, their inner aspirations and sentiments have disappeared, but their habits endure, because these habits incorporate objective conditions in themselves. So will it be with our activities. We may desire abolition of war, industrial justice, greater equality of opportunity for all. But no amount of preaching good will or the golden rule or cultivation of sentiments of love and equity will accomplish the results. There must be change in objective arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment not merely on the hearts of men. To think otherwise is to suppose that flowers can be raised in a desert or motor cars run in a jungle. Both things can happen and without a miracle. But only by first changing the jungle and desert.

Yet the distinctively personal or subjective factors in habit count. Taste for flowers may be the initial step in building reservoirs and irrigation canals. The stimulation of desire and effort is one preliminary in the change of surroundings. While personal exhortation, advice and instruction is a feeble stimulus compared with that which steadily proceeds from the impersonal forces and depersonalized habitudes of the environment, yet they may start the latter going. Taste, appreciation and effort always spring from some accomplished objective situation. They have objective support; they represent the liberation of something formerly accomplished so that it is useful in further operation. A genuine appreciation of the beauty of flowers is not generated within a self-enclosed conscious-It reflects a world in which beautiful flowers have already grown and been enjoyed. Taste and desire represent a prior objective fact recurring in action to secure perpetuation and extension. Desire for flowers comes after actual enjoyment of flowers. But it comes before the work that makes the desert blossom, it comes before cultivation of plants. Every ideal is preceded by an actuality; but the ideal is more than a repetition in inner image of the actual. It projects in securer and wider and fuller form some good which has been previously experienced in a precarious, accidental, fleeting way.


It is a significant fact that in order to appreciate the peculiar place of habit in activity we have to betake ourselves to bad habits, foolish idling, gambling, addiction to liquor and drugs. When we think of such habits, the union of habit with desire and with propulsive power is forced upon us. When we think of habits in terms of walking, playing a musical instrument, typewriting, we are much given to thinking of habits as technical abilities existing apart from our likings and as lacking in urgent impulsion. We think of them as passive tools waiting to be called into action from without. A bad habit suggests an inherent tendency to action and also a hold, command over us. It makes us do things we are ashamed of, things which we tell ourselves we prefer not to do. It overrides our formal resolutions, our conscious decisions. When we are honest with ourselves we acknowledge that a habit has this power because it is so intimately a part of ourselves. It has a hold upon us because we are the habit.

Our self-love, our refusal to face facts, combined perhaps with a sense of a possible better although unrealized self, leads us to eject the habit from the thought of ourselves and conceive it as an evil power which has somehow overcome us. We feed our conceit by recalling that the habit was not deliberately formed; we never intended to become idlers or gamblers or rouès. And how can anything be deeply ourselves which developed accidentally, without set intention? These traits of a bad habit are precisely the things which are most instructive about all habits and about ourselves. They teach us that all habits are affections, that all have projectile power, and that a predisposition formed by a number of specific acts is an immensely more intimate and fundamental part of ourselves than are vague, general, conscious choices. All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they are will. They form our effective desires and they furnish us with our working capacities. They rule our thoughts, determining which shall appear and be strong and which shall pass from light into obscurity.


Excerpted from Human Nature and Conduct by John Dewey. Copyright © 2002 Dover Publications, Inc.. Excerpted by permission of Dover Publications, Inc..
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

Table of Contents

Contempt for human nature
Pathology of goodness
Value of science
Part 1The Place of Habit in Conduct
Section IHabits as Social Functions14
Habits as functions and arts
Social complicity
Subject factor
Section IIHabits and Will24
Active means
Ideas of ends
Means and ends
Nature of character
Section IIICharacter and Conduct43
Good will and consequences
Virtues and natural goods
Objective and subjective morals
Section IVCustom and Habit58
Human psychology is social
Habit as conservative
Mind and body
Section VCustom and Morality75
Customs as standards
Authority of standards
Class conflicts
Section VIHabit and Social Psychology84
Isolation of individuality
Newer movements
Part 2The Place of Impulse in Conduct
Section IImpulses and Change of Habits89
Present interest in instincts
Impulses as re-organizing
Section IIPlasticity of Impulse95
Impulse and education
Uprush of impulse
Fixed codes
Section IIIChanging Human Nature106
Habits the inert factor
Modification of impulses
War a social function
Economic regimes as social products
Nature of motives
Section IVImpulse and Conflict of Habits125
Possibility of social betterment
Section VClassification of Instincts131
False simplifications
Will to power
Acquisitive and creative
Section VINo Separate Instincts149
Uniqueness of acts
Possibilities of operation
Necessity of play and art
Section VIIImpulse and Thought169
Part 3The Place of Intelligence in Conduct
Section IHabit and Intelligence172
Habits and intellect
Mind, habit and impulse
Section IIThe Psychology of Thinking181
The trinity of intellect
Conscience and its alleged separate subject-matter
Section IIIThe Nature of Deliberation189
Deliberation as imaginative rehearsal
Preference and choice
Strife of reason and passion
Nature of reason
Section IVDeliberation and Calculation199
Error in utilitarian theory
Place of the pleasant
Hedonistic calculus
Deliberation and prediction
Section VThe Uniqueness of Good210
Fallacy of a single good
Applied to utilitarianism
Profit and personality
Means and ends
Section VIThe Nature of Aims223
Theory of final ends
Aims as directive means
Ends as justifying means
Meaning well as an aim
Wishes and aims
Section VIIThe Nature of Principles238
Desire for certainty
Morals and probabilities
Importance of generalizations
Section VIIIDesire and Intelligence248
Object and consequence of desire
Desire and quiescence
Self-deception in desire
Desire needs intelligence
Nature of idealism
Living in the ideal
Section IXThe Present and Future265
Subordination of activity to result
Control of future
Production and consummation
Idealism and distant goals
Part 4Conclusion
Section IThe Good of Activity278
Better and worse
Morality a process
Evolution and progress
Making others happy
Section IIMorals are Human295
Humane morals
Natural law and morals
Place of science
Section IIIWhat is Freedom?303
Elements in freedom
Capacity in action
Novel possibilities
Force of desire
Section IVMorality is Social314
Conscience and responsibility
Social pressure and opportunity
Exaggeration of blame
Importance of social psychology
Category of right
The community as religious symbol

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See All Customer Reviews

Human Nature and Conduct (Barnes & Noble Library of Essential Reading) 4.6 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 7 reviews.
Anonymous More than 1 year ago
&#9788 &Omega &#9812 &#9813 &#9814 &#9815 &#9816 &#9817 &#9818 &#9819 &#9820
Anonymous More than 1 year ago
Move to ramdomness res one! Megan is locked out!
Anonymous More than 1 year ago
Blue smiled, "Good. I will see you around, then."
Anonymous More than 1 year ago
Anonymous More than 1 year ago
Neitzsche was German. 19th century. Not early American.
Lillip More than 1 year ago
Well-written, clear and concise, in most respects. Dewey's thoughts are an excellent exposure of early 20th century theory that is still useful today for understanding human and social conduct. Does rely heavily on Dewey's educational theories of childhood development.
Anonymous More than 1 year ago