A National Book Award Finalist and New York Times Bestseller
The Green Zone, Baghdad, Iraq, 2003: in this walled-off compound of swimming pools and luxurious amenities, Paul Bremer and his Coalition Provisional Authority set out to fashion a new, democratic Iraq. Staffed by idealistic aides chosen primarily for their views on issues such as abortion and capital punishment, the CPA spent the crucial first year of occupation pursuing goals that had little to do with the immediate needs of a postwar nation: flat taxes instead of electricity and deregulated health care instead of emergency medical supplies.
In this acclaimed firsthand account, the former Baghdad bureau chief of The Washington Post gives us an intimate portrait of life inside this Oz-like bubble, which continued unaffected by the growing mayhem outside. This is a quietly devastating tale of imperial folly, and the definitive history of those early days when things went irrevocably wrong in Iraq.
|Publisher:||Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|
|Product dimensions:||5.19(w) x 7.97(h) x 0.82(d)|
About the Author
Rajiv Chandrasekaran is an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post and currently heads the Post's continuous news department, which provides breaking news stories to the paper's Web site, washingtonpost.com. Prior to that he was bureau chief in Baghdad, before, during, and after the war. Previously he served as Cairo bureau chief and Southeast Asia correspondent, and covered the war in Afghanistan. He joined the Post in 1994. He has served as the journalist in residence at the International Reporting Project at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies in Washington, and as a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, also in Washington.
Date of Birth:January 22, 1973
Place of Birth:Palo Alto, California
Education:B.A., Stanford University, 1994
Read an Excerpt
Versailles on the Tigris
UNLIKE ALMOST ANYWHERE else in Baghdad, you could dine at the cafeteria in the Republican Palace for six months and never eat hummus, flatbread, or a lamb kebab. The fare was always American, often with a Southern flavor. A buffet featured grits, cornbread, and a bottomless barrel of pork: sausage for breakfast, hot dogs for lunch, pork chops for dinner. There were bacon cheeseburgers, grilled- cheese-and-bacon sandwiches, and bacon omelets. Hundreds of Iraqi secretaries and translators who worked for the occupation authority had to eat in the dining hall. Most of them were Muslims, and many were offended by the presence of pork. But the American contractors running the kitchen kept serving it. The cafeteria was all about meeting American needs for high-calorie, high-fat comfort food.
None of the succulent tomatoes or the crisp cucumbers grown in Iraq made it into the salad bar. U.S. government regulations dictated that everything, even the water in which hot dogs were boiled, be shipped in from approved suppliers in other nations. Milk and bread were trucked in from Kuwait, as were tinned peas and carrots. The breakfast cereal was flown in from the United States—made-in-the-USA Froot Loops and Frosted Flakes at the breakfast table helped boost morale.
When the Americans had arrived, there was no cafeteria in the palace. Saddam Hussein had feasted in an ornate private dining room and his servants had eaten in small kitchenettes. The engineers assigned to transform the palace into the seat of the American occupation chose a marble-floored conference room the size of a gymnasium to serve as the mess hall. Halliburton, the defense contractor hired to run the palace, brought in dozens of tables, hundreds of stacking chairs, and a score of glass-covered buffets. Seven days a week, the Americans ate under Saddam’s crystal chandeliers.
Red and white linens covered the tables. Diners sat on chairs with maroon cushions. A pleated skirt decorated the salad bar and the dessert table, which was piled high with cakes and cookies. The floor was polished after every meal.
A mural of the World Trade Center adorned one of the entrances. The Twin Towers were framed within the outstretched wings of a bald eagle. Each branch of the U.S. military—the army, air force, marines, and navy—had its seal on a different corner of the mural. In the middle were the logos of the New York City Police and Fire departments, and atop the towers were the words thank god for the coalition forces & freedom fighters at home and abroad.
At another of the three entrances was a bulletin board with posted notices, including
those that read, bible study—wednesdays at 7 p.m.
go running with the hash house harriers!
feeling stressed? come visit us at the combat stress clinic.
for sale: like-new hunting knife.
lost camera. reward offered.
The kitchen, which had once prepared gourmet meals for Saddam, had been converted into an institutional food processing center, with a giant deep fryer and bathtub-size mixing bowls. Halliburton had hired dozens of Pakistanis and Indians to cook and serve and clean, but no Iraqis. Nobody ever explained why, but everyone knew. They could poison the food.
The Pakistanis and the Indians wore white button-down shirts with black vests, black bow ties, and white paper hats. The Kuwaiti subcontractor who kept their passports and exacted a meaty profit margin off each worker also dinned into them American lingo. When I asked one of the Indians for French fries, he snapped: “We have no French fries here, sir. Only freedom fries.”
The seating was as tribal as that at a high school cafeteria. The Iraqi support staffers kept to themselves. They loaded their lunch trays with enough calories for three meals. Between mouthfuls, they mocked their American bosses with impunity. So few Americans in the palace spoke Arabic fluently that those who did could have fit around one table, with room to spare.
Soldiers, private contractors, and mercenaries also segregated themselves. So did the representatives of the “coalition of the willing”—the Brits, the Aussies, the Poles, the Spaniards, and the Italians. The American civilians who worked for the occupation government had their own cliques: the big-shot political appointees, the twentysomethings fresh out of college, the old hands who had arrived in Baghdad in the first weeks of occupation. In conversation at their tables, they observed an unspoken protocol. It was always appropriate to praise “the mission”—the Bush administration’s campaign to transform Iraq into a peaceful, modern, secular democracy where everyone, regardless of sect or ethnicity, would get along. Tirades about how Saddam had ruined the country and descriptions of how you were going to resuscitate it were also fine. But unless you knew someone really, really well, you didn’t question American policy over a meal.
If you had a complaint about the cafeteria, Michael Colewas the man to see. He was Halliburton’s “customer-service liaison,” and he could explain why the salad bar didn’t have Iraqi produce or why pork kept appearing on the menu. If you wanted to request a different type of breakfast cereal, he’d listen. Cole didn’t have the weathered look of a war-zone concierge. He was a rail-thin twenty-two- year-old whose forehead was dotted with pimples.
He had been out of college for less than a year and was working as a junior aide to a Republican congressman from Virginia when a Halliburton vice president overheard him talking to friends in an Arlington bar about his dealings with irate constituents. She was so impressed that she introduced herself. If she needed someone to work as a valet in Baghdad, he joked, he’d be happy to volunteer. Three weeks later, Halliburton offered him a job. Then they asked for his résumé.
Cole never ate pork products in the mess hall. He knew many of the servers were Pakistani Muslims and he felt terrible that they had to handle food they deemed offensive. He was rewarded for his expression of respect with invitations to the Dickensian trailer park where the kitchen staff lived. They didn’t have to abide by American rules governing food procurement. Their kitchens were filled with local produce, and they cooked spicy curries that were better than anything Cole found in the cafeteria. He thought of proposing an Indian- Pakistani food night at the mess hall, but then remembered that the palace didn’t do ethnic fare. “The cooking had to make people feel like they were back at home,” he said. And home, in this case, was presumed to be somewhere south of the Mason-Dixon Line.
Cole’s mission was to keep the air in the bubble, to ensure that the Americans who had left home to work for the occupation administration felt comfortable. Food was part of it. But so were movies, mattresses, and laundry service. If he was asked for something, Cole tried to get it, whether he thought it important or not. “Yes, sir. We’ll look into that,” he’d say. Or, “I’m sorry you’re so upset. We’ll try to fix it as soon as possible.”
The palace was the headquarters of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the American occupation administration in Iraq. From April 2003 to June 2004, the CPA ran Iraq’s government—it enacted laws, printed currency, collected taxes, deployed police, and spent oil revenue. At its height, the CPA had more than 1,500 employees in Baghdad, most of them American. They were a motley bunch: businessmen who were active in the Republican Party, retirees who wanted one last taste of adventure, diplomats who had studied Iraq for years, recent college graduates who had never had a full-time job, government employees who wanted the 25 percent salary bonus paid for working in a war zone. The CPA was headed by America’s viceroy in Iraq, Lewis Paul Bremer III, who always wore a blue suit and tan combat boots, even on those summer days when Iraqis drooped in the heat. He was surrounded by burly, submachine gun–toting bodyguards everywhere he went, even to the bathroom in the palace.
The palace was Versailles on the Tigris. Constructed of sandstone and marble, it had wide hallways, soaring columns, and spiral staircases. Massive bronze busts of Saddam in an Arab warrior’s headdress looked down from the four corners of the roof. The cafeteria was on the south side, next to a chapel with a billboard-size mural of a Scud missile arcing into the sky. In the northern wing was an enormous ballroom with a balcony overlooking the dance floor. The heart of the palace was a giant marble rotunda with a turquoise dome. After the Americans arrived, the entire place took on the slapdash appearance of a start-up company. Dell computers sat atop ornate wooden desks partitioned by fabric-covered cubicle dividers. Data cables snaked along the gilded moldings. Erasable whiteboards hung from the mirrored walls.
A row of portable toilets lined the rear driveway. The palace, designed as a showplace for Saddam to meet visiting dignitaries, lacked enough commodes for hundreds of occupants. Dormitory space was also in short supply. Most new arrivals had to sleep on bunk beds in the chapel, a room that came to resemble a World War II field hospital.
Appearances aside, the same rules applied in the palace asin any government building in Washington. Everyone wore an identification badge. Decorum was enforced in the high-ceilinged halls. I remember hearing a soldier admonish a staffer hustling to a meeting: “Ma’am, you must not run in the corridor.”
Whatever could be outsourced was. The job of setting up town and city councils was performed by a North Carolina firm for $236 million. The job of guarding the viceroy was assigned to private guards, each of whom made more than $1,000 a day. For running the palace—cooking the food, changing the lightbulbs, doing the laundry, watering the plants— Halliburton had been handed hundreds of millions of dollars.
Halliburton had been hired to provide “living support” services to the CPA. What that meant kept evolving. When the first Americans arrived in Baghdad in the weeks after Saddam’s government was toppled, all anyone wanted was food and water, laundry service, and air-conditioning. By the time Cole arrived, in August 2003, four months into the occupation, the demands had grown. The viceroy’s house had to be outfitted with furniture and art suitable for a head of state. The Halliburton-run sports bar at the al-Rasheed Hotel needed a Foosball table. The press conference room required large- screen televisions.
The Green Zone quickly became Baghdad’s Little America. Everyone who worked in the palace lived there, either in white metal trailers or in the towering al-Rasheed. Hundreds of private contractors working for firms including Bechtel, General Electric, and Halliburton set up trailer parks there, as did legions of private security guards hired to protect the contractors. The only Iraqis allowed inside the Green Zone were those who worked for the Americans or those who could prove that they had resided there before the war.
It was Saddam who first decided to turn Baghdad’s prime riverfront real estate into a gated city within a city, with posh villas, bungalows, government buildings, shops, and even a hospital. He didn’t want his aides and bodyguards, who were given homes near his palace, to mingle with the masses. And he didn’t want outsiders peering in. The homes were bigger, the trees greener, the streets wider than in the rest of Baghdad. There were more palms and fewer people. There were no street vendors and no beggars. No one other than members of Saddam’s inner circle or his trusted cadre of guards and housekeepers had any idea what was inside. Those who loitered near the entrances sometimes landed in jail. Iraqis drove as fast as they could on roads near the compound lest they be accused of gawking.
It was the ideal place for the Americans to pitch their tents. Saddam had surrounded the area with a tall brick wall. There were only three points of entry. All the military had to do was park tanks at the gates.
The Americans expanded Saddam’s neighborhood by a few blocks to encompass the gargantuan Convention Center and the al-Rasheed, a once- luxurious establishment made famous by CNN’s live broadcasts during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. They fortified the perimeter with seventeen-foot-high blast barriers made of foot-thick concrete topped with coils of razor wire.
Open spaces became trailer parks with grandiose names. CPA staffers unable to snag a room at the al-Rasheed lived in Poolside Estates. Cole and his fellow Halliburton employees were in Camp Hope. The Brits dubbed their accommodations Ocean Cliffs. At first, the Americans felt sorry for the Brits, whose trailers were in a covered parking garage, which seemed dark and miserable. But when the insurgents began firing mortars into the Green Zone, everyone wished they were in Ocean Cliffs. The envy increased when Americans discovered that the Brits didn’t have the same leaky trailers with plastic furniture supplied by Halliburton; theirs had been outfitted by Ikea.
Americans drove around in new GMC Suburbans, dutifully obeying the thirty-five-mile-an-hour speed limit signs posted by the CPA on the flat, wide streets. There were so many identical Suburbans parked in front of the palace that drivers had to use their electronic door openers as homing devices. (One contractor affixed Texas license plates to his vehicle to set it apart.) When they cruised around, they kept the air-conditioning on high and the radio tuned to 107.7 FM, Freedom Radio, an American-run station that played classic rock and rah-rah messages. Every two weeks, the vehicles were cleaned at a Halliburton car wash.
Shuttle buses looped around the Green Zone at twenty-minute intervals, stopping at wooden shelters to transport those who didn’t have cars and didn’t want to walk. There was daily mail delivery. Generators ensured that the lights were always on. If you didn’t like what was being served in the cafeteria—or you were feeling peckish between meals—you could get takeout from one of the Green Zone’s Chinese restaurants. Halliburton’s dry-cleaning service would get the dust and sweat stains out of your khakis in three days. A sign warned patrons to remove ammunition from pockets before submitting clothes.
Iraqi laws and customs didn’t apply inside the Green Zone. Women jogged on the sidewalk in shorts and T-shirts. A liquor store sold imported beer, wine, and spirits. One of the Chinese restaurants offered massages as well as noodles. The young boys selling DVDs near the palace parking lot had a secret stash. “Mister, you want porno?” they whispered to me.
Most Americans sported suede combat boots, expensive sunglasses, and nine-millimeter Berettas attached to the thigh with a Velcro holster. They groused about the heat and the mosquitoes and the slothful habits of the natives. A contingent of Gurkhas stood as sentries in front of the palace.
If there was any law in the Green Zone, it was American. Military police pulled drivers over for speeding and drunk driving. When a shipment of office safes arrived, Halliburton prevented its American employees from lifting or delivering them until hand trucks and back braces had been sent to Baghdad. When one CPA staffer complained that she needed her safe—she said she was storing tens of thousands of dollars in her office toilet—Cole explained that Halliburton had to follow American occupational safety regulations.
Table of ContentsMap of the Green Zone
PART ONE—BUILDING THE BUBBLE
1 Versailles on the Tigris
2 A Deer in the Headlights
The Green Zone, Scene
3 You’re in Charge!
The Green Zone, Scene II
4 Control Freak
The Green Zone, Scene III
5 Who Are These People?
The Green Zone, Scene IV
6 We Need to Rethink This
The Green Zone, Scene V
7 Bring a Duffel Bag
The Green Zone, Scene VI
8 A Yearning for Old Times
PART TWO—SHATTERED DREAMS
9 Let This Be Over
The Green Zone, Scene VII
10 The Plan Unravels
The Green Zone, Scene VIII
11 A Fool’s Errand
The Green Zone, Scene IX
12 We Cannot Continue Like This
The Green Zone, Scene X
13 Missed Opportunities
The Green Zone, Scene XI
14 Breaking the Rules
The Green Zone, Scene XII
15 Crazy, If Not Suicidal
The Green Zone, Scene XIII
16 Lot Left to Be Done
What People are Saying About This
"Rajiv Chandrasekaran has not given us "another Iraq book." He has given us a riveting tale of American misadventure. . . . He shows us American idealism and voyeurism, as well as the deadly results of American hubris. And by giving us the first full picture from inside the Green Zone, he depicts a mission doomed to failure before it had even been launched."
---Samantha Power, author of A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide
"This is a dazzling, important, and entertaining work of reportage about the American civilians who tried to remake Iraq, and about the strange, isolated city-state in Baghdad where they failed. Every American who wants to understand how and why things went so badly wrong in Iraq should read this book."
---Steve Coll, author of Ghost Wars
"This amazing book pulls back the curtains of deception and reveals in stunning fashion what really went on inside the Emerald City in the crucial year after the military overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Chandrasekaran’s reporting is vivid and relentless as he documents the mix of idealism, confidence, energy, hubris, political miscalculation, cultural blindness, and fantastical thinking of those who came to save Iraq yet made a difficult situation worse."
---David Maraniss, author of They Marched Into Sunlight
"An extraordinarily vivid and compelling anatomy of a fiasco. Imperial Life in the Emerald City is an indispensable saga of how the American liberation of Iraq turned to chaos, calamity, and civil war. Chandrasekaran takes us inside Baghdad’s Green Zone as no one else has."
---Rick Atkinson, author of The Long Gray Line
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
So much of what I read in this book was almost unbelievable, but based on what else I know about the Bush administration, I believe it. The level of incompetence and corruption in our government is astounding, and I think we need many more books such as this that exposes it. As for the book specifically, the writing is solid, and the author mixes enough humorous or shocking anecdotes with hard facts to keep the reader from getting bored or overwhelmed. The book gives you the information you need, without being pumped full of overly specialized facts that are useless to the general reader, and it manages to do this without dumbing anything down. An excellent piece of non-fiction.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran has done a service to the American public by writing this book. He has described the immediate reaction to the defeat of Saddam by the administration and the military, not always on the same page, and provided the clues we had been seeking as to what went wrong. Now we know. The viceroy assigned to 'lead the Iraqis', Paul Bremer, repeatedly demonstrated poor judgments, hired staff members with their own agenda and demonstrated a general ineptness of the entire Baghdad team that boggles the mind. Of course, when assignments were made to top posts based not on experience and knowledge but on their political connection or viewpoint, you are going to make serious errors. Children almost, people in their early 20's were given titles like Minister of Finance or assignments to overhaul the stock exchange. It does not take a genius to figure the folly of that plan. In fact, decisions given by all staff members, made filmdom's Keystone Kops look like a pristine Navy Seal unit by comparison. Having talked to others who have read this marvelous book that gives us insights not to be found elsewhere, the most common thread follows one theme. They say, 'I had to put the book down over and over because I was so outraged by the information. This is America, we are better than that.' I share their sentiments, and found this book disturbing because of the reality of what took place. The outrage comes because now we know the conditions, and it is a precarious almost untenable position. All of that could have been avoided if only people of honor, knowledge of the region and a purpose of serving their country instead of themselves were selected.
The Author's style of writing is such that it makes one visualize his writings as if you were there with him. Finally more of the truth is coming out to show Bremer was just there to write a book for when he departed. What a waste he was, there must be better people to do a job, except good people don't get a job there unless they swear their support of the Orwellian Administration lead by Cheney, Rumsfield and Bush reading the teleprompter.
If this book was written as a work of fiction in 2003, no one would have thought it possible. It is amazing the level of incompetence displayed by the Americans in Iraq. Appointing political hacks to very important positions, people who have no knowledge of Iraq and refused to learn and just a general sense of 'Oh course I'm right, I'm an American.' Anyone with some sense will not be surprised by this book and those who could learn the most from it will probably never read it.
This was an excellent depiction of the American run government after the toppling of the Baathist regime in Iraq. It is full of vignettes that depict the absolute chaos that ensued: a sad and comic example of ideology mixed with a lack of planning, foresight, coordination, and direction. A must read for those who want to get a flavor of the time.
This was, without question, the best account of America's post-invasion of Iraq. The author gave a very detailed description not only of the Green Zone, but of the Coalition Provisional Authority and it's ineptitude. The author also exposed the Bush Administration's efforts to force Iraqis to accept the governing body of exiles that were hand-picked puppets. He (author) demonstrated his credibility by actually talking to Iraqi citizens who were impacted by America's decision to put Paul Bremer in charge.
Staggering. Never assume your leadership is competent. Question them. This book is a stunning example of people in power being blinded by their own convictions and acting irresponsibly. It makes much more sense now in seeing how Iraq fell apart. The endless examples of foolhardy behavior by our leadership and the people inside the Green Zone are outrageous and after a time make you embarassed for our country. We sent a lot of brave soliders over there who did their best in trying conditions, but we sent buffoons to lead them or plan their actions.
I picked up this book for some research on a novel about the war in Iraq. I obtained it for free from the VA so I am not a verified purchaser. My edition includes a small photo on the cover of Matt Damon in Green Zone and the blurb, "The inspiration for the major motion picture." I did not see the movie. I have been looking forward to reading this for some time but was put off by endorsements like this from John Le Carre, "Black comedy, set in the graveyard of the neo-conservative dream. Superb." Uh-oh. Le Carre is one of my favorite authors but his politics are boorish and he's ruined a few of his post-cold war novels with his striking ultra-leftist, virtue-signaling disdain for all things American. I feared Rajiv Chandrasekaran, the Washington Post journalist, liberal and author of Imperial Life, did the same thing with this book. He did but it's not as bad as I expected. Truth is, there is important history recorded here. And Imperial Life is readable history. That's important. Imperial Life is Chandrasekaran's observations during his one-year stay in the Green Zone, that highly secure, highly comfortable and oblivious slice of America planted in the heart of Bagdad, where US and allied military leaders, diplomats, government employees, contractors and a few lucky Iraqis lived, worked, breathed, ate, got married, dreamed and schemed their way through the messy "post-war, nation-building phase" of the Iraqi quagmire. Paul Bremer's CPA was trying to stamp a secular Western, Liberal Democracy over the ruins of Saddam's broken Baathist State, an exercise in money-flushing, futility if there ever was one. Chandrasekaran does a great job recording the foibles and follies of this vain exercise. He details important lessons in failed civic action, yet covers a wide-range of topics from military realities to failed infrastructure projects to loopy economic schemes to frustrated Iraqi aspirations and dashed dreams. He chronicles the lessons-learned that probably would have been lost had this book not been written (I HIGHLY recommend this book to those in the military Civil Affairs community, civilian NGO community and academics who support democratic nation-building). This is the greatness of this book that should have given it immediate 4-star status on any review site. But there are some glaring deficiencies. The most obvious is his complete failure to dissect the problem of democracy in any Islamic state. Islam, with it's Sharia law and various religious rationalizations, has never successfully supported more than half a generation of Democratic ideals. The most democratic Islamic republics like Turkey have had to create powerful secular institutions to maintain the democratic façade. Iraq has no such institutions except for those of Saddam's old Baathist structure, a structure the American invasion destroyed or naively dismantled. Chandrasekaran does suggest the obvious, that some of that Baathist construct (like police, fire and military elements) should have remained in place. But American idealism would have none of it. The other issue Chandrasekaran can't seem to resolve is a desire on his part to both condemn Saddam's old society and condemn the George W. Bush occupation regime at the same time. I detected at least one instance of Chandrasekaran suggesting that a certain condition was much better under Saddam before the Americans arrived... and then several chapters later, he notes that this same condition improved after the invasion.
$9.74 at Amazon. Excellent read.
Rajiv was a WashPo reporter in Iraq from pre-invasion to late 2004. The core of his narrative is the period under Bremer when the CPA (the US civilians tasked with re-building Iraq) were stationed in the Green Zone (ie. Emerald City because in Oz, the city was Green, except that everyone wore green-colored glasses). It is a devastating account of American corruption, incompetence, denial of reality and humanitarian crimes. We get to see the reality behind the headlines during a period when we were told everything was going well and getting better when in facts things were getting worse - not in spite of the Americans, but because of the Americans. Most people today blame the CPA, Bremer in particular, which is all this book focuses on. Another book Fiasco looks at the military as well and offers some larger lessons.After reading this I am left wondering how things could have gone better. No doubt Iraq is a tough place and no plan could have gone perfectly. The biggest mistake was the assumption that free Iraq would welcome Democracy with open arms. Creating a Democracy and capitalist economy is one of the hardest things that can be done, look at the history of the west and how long it took and how bloody it has been. Dictatorships and the like are easy to set up, that is why there are so many of them. In a collapsed stated like Iraq, creating a Democracy and capitalism in a few years through American intervention was never going to work because the Iraqi's never really wanted it. It can't be forced. Many critics were saying this from the start, and the neo-cons had no plan to implement their vision - it was an afterthought after WMD's were not found.
Do you think you know every bone-headed decision that was made by the Bush administration on the civilian side of occupied Iraq? Well, guess what, I assure you that Chandrasekaran has found plenty more. Plus, the ones that you already knew were probably because of his reporting in the Washington Post in the first place. I'm not a fan of reading about military campaigns, so I have to admit that I'll never read many of the other books put on lists of great books that have come out of Persian Gulf II, like those of Thomas Ricks. That means that to me, this is the one and only book that everyone should read about the Iraq War. Just to be clear, though I'm incredibly politically biased, Chandrasekaran isn't. This is not a polemic. There are plenty of positive stories included, but seriously, how positive how you be in the middle of one of the greatest failures in the history of American imperialism?
Eye-opening account of deliberate incompetence.
Having not followed most of Chandrasekaran's reporting for the "Washington Post," I really can't say how much of this is a cut-and-paste job of the man's previous work. However, one does get a broad survey of the period when the Civilian Provisional Authority purported to run the country, and it's a quick and snappy read to boot. The sad thing is that from procounsel Jerry Bremer on down most of the people involved probably meant well, but they could never quite connect with the reality that they had a real county on their hands, and ultimately did little to ameliorate the pressing problems of Iraqi society. It's almost enough to make one believe that simply foisting Ahmed Chalabi on Iraqis as the country's new maximum leader would have been a better solution.
Excellent journalistic account of the brief, pathetic history of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The occupation was not planned or thought out well at all. Ideological correctness was valued over competence as inexperienced Bush loyalists replaced those with some experience on the ground. Twenty-something congressional staffers were put in charge of rebuilding a country the size of Iraq.Chandrasekaran also has some memorable sketches of some familiar figures. Paul Bremer is not a sympathetic figure. He comes across as hard working but also as something of a control freak. Henry Kissinger, his former boss, called him this! (Place that in the category of "it takes one to know one.") His grandiose plans for Iraq fell apart as the basic needs of the Iraqi people (safety, electricity, jobs, etc.) were not met.Chandrasekaran covered the Green Zone for The Washington Post and has an insiders knowledge of the occupation. He also writes clearly and breaks down complex issues in an accessible style. He fills a need for books on the CPA; there are few out there.
Read this and get some first-hand understanding about the difficulties we've had in accomplishing statecraft from within. Rajiv Chandrasekaran is a Washington Post reporter who covered the CPA's attempt to restore order in Iraq. His balanced account shows some clear blunders. We dissolved the military, creating 40,000 unemployed former soldiers. We banned Baath party members, including most of the former government and technical specialists, from important jobs. We may have created more division through the quota-based approach we attempted to use in establishing representative democracy. I believe the restored hospital I heard about in e-mail forwards was the one that was restored within the Green Zone. Chandrasekaran adds interest to the politics through his description of the personalities and daily life in Sadaam's former protected area. Many of the stories are ironic - such as the former St. John's professor who arrived without having read anything about Iraq. Most of the stories about our decisions and business dealings describe actions that range between sad and reprehensible.
Excellent book - another one for my IR of the Middle East class. All I can say is "wow." I never agreed with the Iraq War, but never really had any facts to back up my opinion other than personal feeling. However, after this book, it is plainly obvious that we never should have started this war. The Bush administration created a huge $3 trillion mess for the American people to pay for. It's ludicrous. All the people who were properly qualified to turn Iraq around were overlooked or dismissed so "loyalists" could be in control. Is this the beginning of the 20th century? when the huge political machines controlled America, where nothing but your party affiliation mattered. After this and "The Looming Tower" I am thoroughly disgusted with the Bush administration and disgusted with humanity in general. All nations and peoples resort to violence when they don't get their way, and rather than put the good of all first, they cater to their personal interests and egos. Sorry for the tirade. I do feel I should read another book from a different viewpoint, though, because one should always see both sides before completely making one's own mind. I'll get around to it sometime I suppose.
Imperial Life in the Emerald City tells a story of the Coalition Provisional Authority - who were apparently mostly a group of young, ideological neocons, hoping their work in Iraq would expediate their rise in the Republican Party. Few of them had the even close to the experience necessary for the job - the litmus test for hiring appears to have been commitment to a specific ideology rather than competence. On top of this - they were sent to fail. No one in power seemed to understood the magnitude of the task at hand. Communicating potential for failure was not an option - nor was getting the resoures you needed to accomplish your tasks. Nor was leaving a small compound, the heart of which was a dictator's palace. From any situation like this, a series of surreal stories will emerge - this book tells them. But it does little else. The author appears to have spoken to a few disgruntled CPA employees and discuss their experience in absence of much other context. Any "success" is minimized, any failure magnified. Of the multitude of books I have read on American failures in the "War on Terror" - this is by far the worst. If you just can't resist collecting highlights of neocon arrogance, read this book. If you are looking to understand the situation in Iraq - Fiasco is a much better choice.