Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks

Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks

by Barry R. Posen

Paperback(Reprint)

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Overview

In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.

Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.

The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780801478857
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Publication date: 01/13/2014
Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Edition description: Reprint
Pages: 296
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.90(d)
Age Range: 18 Years

About the Author

Barry R. Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Security Studies Program at MIT. He is the author of Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (winner of the Furniss Award and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award) and Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks, all from Cornell.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: A Model of Inadvertent Escalation
2. Air War and Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation
3. The Balance of Ground Forces on the Central Front
4. Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank
5. "Offensive" and “Defensive” Sea Control: A Comparative Assessment
6. Conclusion

Appendix 1. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Model
Appendix 2. Central Region Close Air Support Aircraft and Atack Helicopters (1988)
Appendix 3. The Attrition-FEBA Expansion Model: Symphony Version
Appendix 4. A Barrier Defense Model

Selected Bibliography
Index

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