ISBN-10:
0198290500
ISBN-13:
9780198290506
Pub. Date:
05/28/1997
Publisher:
Oxford University Press, USA
International Trade, Factor Movements, and the Environment

International Trade, Factor Movements, and the Environment

by M. Rauscher, Michael Rauscher

Hardcover

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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780198290506
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Publication date: 05/28/1997
Pages: 352
Product dimensions: 6.37(w) x 9.50(h) x 0.97(d)
Lexile: 1390L (what's this?)

Table of Contents

Preface v(6)
List of Figures
xi(2)
List of Tables
xiii
1. Introduction
1(18)
1.1 Foreign Trade and the Environment: An Awkward Relationship
1(5)
1.2 The Empirical Evidence: A Survey of the Literature
6(9)
1.3 Organization of the Book
15(4)
2. Basic Concepts and Definitions
19(20)
2.1 Externalities, Property Rights, and Market Failure
19(3)
2.2 Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Environmental Policies
24(3)
2.3 The Endowment of a Country with Environment Resources
24(3)
2.4 Ecological Dumping
27(3)
2.5 Emissions as a Factor of Production
30(4)
2.6 Elements of a Model of Environment and the Economy
34(2)
2.7 The Dual Approach
36(2)
Appendix: Properties of Linear Homogeneous Functions
38(1)
3. Environmental Policy and International Capital Movements
39(52)
3.1 Introduction
39(2)
3.2 The Model
41(1)
3.3 Explaining Patterns of Factor Mobility
42(5)
3.4 Access to the World Capital Market: The Small Country
47(5)
3.5 Effects of Changes in Environmental Policy
52(7)
3.6 Optimal Environmental Policies
59(4)
3.7 The Impact of the Policy Measure Chosen in the other Country
63(2)
3.8 Cooperative versus Non-co-operative Equilibria
65(5)
3.9 Capital Taxation as an Instrument of Environmental Policy
70(5)
3.10 Political Factors Determining Environmental Policies in Open Economies
75(2)
3.11 Non-competitive Market Structures and Optimal Environmental Policies
77(3)
3.12 The Choice of Wrong Policy Instruments
80(5)
3.13 Summary of Results
85(2)
Appendix: Results for the Case of Emission Taxes
87(4)
4. International Trade in Hazardous Waste
91(31)
4.1 Introduction
91(2)
4.2 The Model
93(2)
4.3 Explaining the Patterns of Trade
95(2)
4.4 Benefits and Losses from Trade in Toxic Waste
97(6)
4.5 Effects of Changes in Environmental Policy and the Design of Optimal Policies
103(5)
4.6 Environmental Policies when Foreign Emission Taxes Are Taken as Given
108(2)
4.7 Co-operative versus Non-co-operative Environmental Policies
110(5)
4.8 Trade Barriers as an Instrument of Unilateral Environmental Policy
115(1)
4.9 The Issue of Market Power
116(3)
4.10 Summary of Results
119(1)
Appendix: The Gains from Trade in the Case of Emission Taxes
120(2)
5. International Trade in Final Goods: The Case of Perfect Competition
122(39)
5.1 Introduction
122(3)
5.2 The Model
125(1)
5.3 Autarky and the Patterns of Trade
126(6)
5.4 Environmental Policy in the Small-Country Case
132(4)
5.5 Pollute Thy Neighbour via Trade
136(3)
5.6 Gains or Losses from Trade?
139(3)
5.7 The Terms of Trade and the Environment
142(4)
5.8 Environmental Policy in the Large-Country Case: Free Trade
146(6)
5.9 Green Trade Interventions
152(2)
5.10 Non-traded Goods and Environmental Dumping
154(5)
5.11 Summary of Results
159(2)
6. Imperfect Competition, Foreign Trade, and the Environment
161(56)
6.1 An Overview
161(1)
6.2 Monopolies, Foreign Trade, and Environmental Regulation
162(9)
6.3 Environmental Policy and the Locational Decisions of a Monopolist Firm
171(9)
6.4 International Oligopoly and Strategic Environmental Policy
180(10)
6.5 International Oligopoly and the Strategic Choice of Environmental Product Standards
190(11)
6.6 Monopolistic Competition and Intra-Industry Trade
201(11)
6.7 Summary of Results
212(2)
Appendix
214(3)
7. The Political Process and Environmental Policy in Open Economies
217(30)
7.1 The Problem
217(1)
7.2 Representative Democracy and the Capture of Environmental Regulation in an Open Economy
218(5)
7.3 A Partial-Equilibrium Model of Regulatory Capture
223(5)
7.4 Optimal Environmental Policies
228(2)
7.5 Lobbies that Influence Single Policy Instruments
230(3)
7.6 Regulatory Capture of More than One Policy Instrument
233(4)
7.7 Lobbying Activities in the Large-Country Case
237(5)
7.8 Summary of Results
242(2)
Appendix: Comparative Static Results
244(3)
8. Intertemporal Trade and the Environment: The Foreign-Debt Problem
247(25)
8.1 Introduction
247(2)
8.2 The Indebted Country
249(3)
8.3 Optimal Environmental Policies in an Indebted Country
252(3)
8.4 Sub-optimal Environmental Policies
255(2)
8.5 Inferior Consumption and Imported Inputs: Foreign Debt Can Reduce Environmental Problems
257(4)
8.6 Debt Forgiveness: The Lender's View
261(3)
8.7 The Economics of Debt-for-Nature Swaps
264(3)
8.8 General Side Payment Schemes
267(2)
8.9 Summary of Results
269(1)
Appendix: Many Goods in the Debt Model
270(2)
9. Implications of the Theoretical Analyses
272(41)
9.1 An Overview
272(1)
9.2 Summary of Results
272(13)
9.3 Policy Implications for a Single Country
285(10)
9.4 Regulation of Environmental Scarcity and Foreign Trade on the Supra-national Level
295(17)
9.5 Epilogue
312(1)
Appendix: List of Variables 313(2)
References 315(18)
Index 333

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