ISBN-10:
0415680352
ISBN-13:
9780415680356
Pub. Date:
01/09/2013
Publisher:
Taylor & Francis
Law and Politics / Edition 1

Law and Politics / Edition 1

by Keith E. Whittington

Hardcover

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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780415680356
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Publication date: 01/09/2013
Series: Critical Concepts in Political Science Series
Pages: 1808
Product dimensions: 6.25(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

Table of Contents

PROVISIONAL CONTENTS

Volume I

1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’, Harvard Law Review, 1897, 10, 8, 457–78.

2. H. L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review, 1958, 71, 4, 593–600, 606–24.

3. Lon Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’, Harvard Law Review, 1958, 71, 4, 630–5, 638–48, 661–72.

4. Joseph Raz, ‘Authority and Justification’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1985, 14, 1, 3–29.

5. Ronald M. Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’, Critical Inquiry, 1982, 9, 1, 179–200.

6. Charles Howard McIlwain, ‘Some Modern Definitions of Constitutionalism’, and ‘Modern Constitutionalism and Its Problems’, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Cornell University Press, 1947), pp. 1–22, 139–46.

7. Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘The Constitution as an Institution’, Columbia Law Review, 1934, 34, 1, 1–31, 37–40.

8. Keith E. Whittington, ‘Constitutionalism’, in Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 281–99.

9. Clinton Rossiter, ‘Constitutional Dictatorship’ and ‘Constitutional Dictatorship: The Forms, the Dangers, the Criteria, the Future’, Constitutional Dictatorship (Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 3–8, 288–314.

10. James Bradley Thayer, ‘The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law’, Harvard Law Review, 1893, 7, 3, 129–56.

11. John Hart Ely, ‘Policing the Process of Representation: The Court as Referee’, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 75–87, 88–104.

12. Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’, Yale Law Journal, 2006, 115, 6, 1348–59, 1369–401, 1406.

13. Sanford Levinson, ‘"The Constitution" in American Civil Religion’, The Supreme Court Review, 1979, 123–52

Volume II

14. Robert A. Dahl, ‘Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker’, Journal of Public Law, 1957, 6, 2, 279–95.

15. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, ‘Introduction: Supreme Court Policy Making’, ‘Models of Decision Making: The Attitudinal and Rational Choice Models’, and ‘The Decision on the Merits: The Attitudinal and Rational Choice Models’, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1–12, 86–97, 312–26.

16. Richard A. Posner, ‘What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)’, Supreme Court Economic Review, 1993, 3, 1–42.

17. Walter F. Murphy, ‘Marshalling the Court’, Elements of Judicial Strategy (University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 37–78.

18. Ethan Bruce De Mesquita and Matthew C. Stephenson, ‘Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication’, American Political Science Review, 2002, 96, 4, 755–66.

19. Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald R. Songer, ‘Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions’, American Political Science Review, 2000, 94, 1, 101–16.

20. Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, ‘Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court’, American Political Science Review, 1988, 82, 4, 1109–27.

21. Mark A. Graber, ‘The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary’, Studies in American Political Development, 1993, 7, 1, 35–53, 61–73.

22. Howard Gillman, ‘How Political Parties Can Use Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891’, American Political Science Review, 2002, 96, 3, 511–24.

23. Georg Vanberg, ‘Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review’, American Journal of Political Science, 2001, 45, 2, 346–61.

24. Tom S. Clark, ‘The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy’, American Journal of Political Science, 2009, 53, 4, 971–89.

25. John A. Ferejohn and Charles R. Shipan, ‘Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1990, 6, 1, 1–20.

26. Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover, ‘A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations’, American Journal of Political Science, 1992, 36, 1, 96–121.

27. Charles H. Franklin and Liane C. Kosaki, ‘Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion’, American Political Science Review, 1989, 83, 3, 751–71.

28. Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson, ‘The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences’, Journal of Politics, 2004, 66, 4, 1018–35.

29. Gregory A. Huber and Sanford Gordon, ‘Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?’ American Journal of Political Science, 2004, 48, 2, 247–63.

Volume III

30. E. P. Thompson, ‘The Rule of Law’, Whigs and Hunters (Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 258–69.

31. William J. Novak, ‘Public Economy: The Well-Ordered Market’, The People’s Welfare (University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 83–95.

32. Robert A. Kagan, ‘Adversarial Legalism and American Government’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1991, 10, 3, 369–79, 392–406.

33. Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 1960, 3, 1, 1–44.

34. Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, ‘Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative’, Law and Social Inquiry, 1995, 29, 2, 197–226.

35. Lauren Beth Edelman, ‘Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law’, American Journal of Sociology, 1992, 97, 6, 1531–5, 1542–69.

36. William L. F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, ‘The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming’, Law and Society Review, 1980–1, 15, 3/4, 631–54.

38. Gerald N. Rosenberg, ‘Bound for Glory? Brown and the Civil Rights Revolution’, The Hollow Hope (University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 42–57.

39. Paul Frymer, ‘Acting When Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–85’, American Political Science Review, 2003, 97, 3, 483–99.

40. Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley, and Paul H. Robinson, ‘Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2002, 83, 2, 284–99.

41. David Garland, ‘The Culture of High Crime Societies’, British Journal of Criminology, 2000, 40, 3, 347, 354–75.

42. Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing’, Law and Society Review, 2003, 37, 3, 513–39.

43. William Haltom and Michael W. McCann, ‘Full Tort Press: Media Coverage of Civil Litigation’, Distorting the Law (University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 147–74.

Volume IV

44. Martin Shapiro, ‘The Prototype of Courts’, Courts (University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 1–35.

45. J. Mark Ramseyer, ‘The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach’, Journal of Legal Studies, 1994, 23, 2, 721–47.

46. Matias Iaryczower, Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi, ‘Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935–1998’, American Journal of Political Science, 2002, 46, 4, 699–716.

47. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Calderia, and Vanessa A. Baird, ‘On the Legitimacy of National High Courts’, American Political Science Review, 1998, 92, 2, 343–58.

48. Ran Hirschl, ‘Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales’, Texas Law Review, 2004, 82, 7, 1819–33, 1854–60.

49. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitments: The Evolution of Institutions: Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History, 1989, 49, 4, 803–32.

50. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and Andrei Schleifer, ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’, Journal of Political Economy, 2004, 112, 2, 445–70.

51. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 2001, 91, 5, 1369–80, 1383–401.

52. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, ‘Criticism of Presidentialism and Responses’, Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 28–54.

53. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, ‘An Epidemiological Analysis of Constitutional Mortality’, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 122–46.

54. Sujit Choudhry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation’, Indiana Law Journal, 1999, 74, 3, 819–26, 833–9, 841–6, 855–8, 866–71, 885–92.

55. Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe’, International Organization, 2000, 54, 2, 217–44, 249–52.

56. Beth A. Simmons, ‘International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs’, American Political Science Review, 2000, 94, 4, 819–35.

57. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, International Organization, 2000, 54, 3, 421–50, 454–6.

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