Plurality-led Congresses are among the most pervasive and least studied phenomena in presidential systems around the world. Often conflated with divided government, where an organized opposition controls a majority of seats in congress, plurality-led congresses are characterized by a party with fewer than 50 percent of the seats still in control of the legislative gates. Extensive gatekeeping authority without plenary majorities, this book shows, leads to policy outcomes that are substantially different from those observed in majority-led congresses. Through detailed analyses of legislative success in Argentina and Uruguay, this book explores the determinants of law enactment in fragmented congresses. It describes in detail how the lack of majority support explains legislative success in standing committees, the chamber directorate, and the plenary floor.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x (d)|
About the Author
Ernesto Calvo is Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Chair of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park. He has received the Lawrence Longley Award and the Leubbert Best Article Award from the Representation section and the Comparative Politics section of the American Political Science Association. Calvo serves on the editorial boards of the American Journal of Political Science and Legislative Studies Quarterly. His research has been published in numerous top US, European, and Latin American journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, World Politics, The British Journal of Political Science, Political Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies, Pol�tica y Gobierno, Desarrollo Econ�mico, Opiniao Publica, and the Revista de Ciencia Politica.
Table of Contents1. Plurality parties, plurality cartels, and legislative success; Part I. Plurality Cartels: 2. Party blocs, committee authorities, and plurality cartels; 3. A statistical model of legislators' success and productivity; Part II. Legislator Success and the Sequential Organization of the Legislative Process: 4. Electoral fragmentation and the effective number of legislative blocs; 5. Legislator success and the committee system in Argentina; 6. On the plenary floor: special motions, vanishing quorum, and the amendment of the plenary schedule; 7. Legislative success in the House; Part III. Beyond Plurality Cartels: 8. The determinants of the president's legislative success; 9. Plurality-led congresses with limited gatekeeping authority: the House of Representatives in Uruguay; 10. Concluding remarks: plurality-led congresses as a research agenda.