Lincoln's Tragic Pragmatism: Lincoln, Douglas, and Moral Conflict

Lincoln's Tragic Pragmatism: Lincoln, Douglas, and Moral Conflict

by John Burt


View All Available Formats & Editions
Choose Expedited Shipping at checkout for guaranteed delivery by Thursday, October 24


In 1858, challenger Abraham Lincoln debated incumbent Stephen Douglas seven times in the race for a U.S. Senate seat from Illinois. More was at stake than slavery in those debates. In Lincoln’s Tragic Pragmatism, John Burt contends that the very legitimacy of democratic governance was on the line. In a United States stubbornly divided over ethical issues, the overarching question posed by the Lincoln-Douglas debates has not lost its urgency: Can a liberal political system be used to mediate moral disputes? And if it cannot, is violence inevitable?

As they campaigned against each other, both Lincoln and Douglas struggled with how to behave when an ethical conflict as profound as the one over slavery strained the commitment upon which democracy depends—namely, to rule by both consent and principle. This commitment is not easily met, because what conscience demands and what it is able to persuade others to consent to are not always the same. While Lincoln ultimately avoided a politics of morality detached from consent, and Douglas avoided a politics of expediency devoid of morality, neither found a way for liberalism to mediate the conflict of slavery.

That some disputes seemed to lie beyond the horizon of deal-making and persuasion and could be settled only by violence revealed democracy’s limitations. Burt argues that the unresolvable ironies at the center of liberal politics led Lincoln to discover liberalism’s tragic dimension—and ultimately led to war. Burt’s conclusions demand reevaluations of Lincoln and Douglas, the Civil War, and democracy itself.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780674050181
Publisher: Harvard
Publication date: 01/07/2013
Pages: 832
Product dimensions: 6.60(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.90(d)

About the Author

John Burt is Professor of English at Brandeis University.

Read an Excerpt

From Chapter Three: Lincoln’s Conspiracy Charge

The metaphor of the House Divided might lead one to anticipate that the argument of the speech would be that the slavery problem was so deep that it would continue to make the United States politically unstable until slavery was abolished. That argument, of course, was perfectly plausible, both in its own day and now. But that wasn’t the argument Lincoln devoted the speech to developing.

The speech was mostly invested in developing two different sorts of conspiracy theory, one of them plausible, one of them implausible. Both are versions of what is called the slave power conspiracy thesis. The larger scale, and more plausible, argument, which I will call the “general” slave power conspiracy thesis, was sketched out in the opening paragraphs of the speech. That argument held that it is in the nature of slavery itself, as an economic, social, and political institution, to entrain the entire society around itself. The general slave power conspiracy thesis argued that the political logic of slave societies dictates that slaveholders must always, in defense of slavery, seek to dominate any republic in which they play a part. The consequence for America is that the slave states must inevitably seek to subvert the political order of the republic or resign themselves to the death of slavery.

This “general slave power conspiracy” argument may not have been entirely a confabulation of what Richard Hofstadter called “the paranoid style,” since there really is a fundamental incompatibility between slavery and democracy that committed the slave states to a destabilizing and ultimately suicidal quest for mastery of the republic, even if, as historians now believe, it was slavery that made the republic possible in the first place.

A more concrete version of the general slave power conspiracy theory might have argued that the slave power actually was meditating a plan to force slavery back into the free states. There is no plausible evidence that the politicians of the slave states were pursuing such an aim in 1858. However, it could be argued that if the slaveholders had to seek mastery of the republic in order to defend slavery, a realistic view of their situation would have dictated that sooner or later they would have had to attempt to nationalize slavery. That said, one can use arguments about the threats that one ideology must sooner or later pose to another to prove almost anything, and arguments of that kind are often self-fulfilling prophecies.

The main charge of the speech was more specific than this, and more problematic. Lincoln devoted most of the “House Divided” speech to the claim that Stephen Douglas, in concert with Presidents Pierce and Buchanan and with Chief Justice Taney, had since some time before 1854 been engineering not only the establishment of slavery in the remaining western territories, but also the reintroduction of slavery into all of the free states by judicial fiat. Lincoln developed what I will call the “special slave power conspiracy thesis” in considerable detail, and most of his evidence was extremely flimsy.

Table of Contents

Preface ix

Acknowledgments xv

1 Introduction: Implicitness and Moral Conflict 1

1.1 Negative Capability 1

1.2 Liberalism and Moral Conflict 10

2 Lincoln's Peoria Speech of 1854 27

2.1 The Debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act 27

2.2 Making and Breaking Deals in 1850 and in 1854 50

2.3 Lincoln's Chief Arguments 62

2.4 The Irony of American History 88

3 Lincoln's Conspiracy Charge 94

3.1 The "House Divided" Metaphor 95

3.2 The Unfolding of the Bleeding Kansas War 104

3.5 Douglas and the Lecompton Constitution 116

3.4 Lincoln's Evidence 124

3.5 Dred Scott II 165

3.6 A Living Dog Is Better than a Dead Lion 174

4 Douglas's Conspiracy Charge 178

4.1 Lincoln and the Founding of the Republican Party 178

4.2 The Reorganization of Parties 183

4.3 From Wing to Republican 213

4.4 Anti-Nebraska and Anti-Lecompton Democrats 221

4.5 The 1854 Platforms 226

4.6 Conspiracies across Party Lines 239

4.7 Sectional and Ideological Parties 247

4.8 Conclusion 269

5 Douglas's Fanaticism Charge 270

5.1 Hostility to New England 271

5.2 The Apodictic Style and Reasonableness 280

5.3 Appeals to the Divine Will 295

5.4 Implicitness and Situatedness 301

5.5 Transformation of Conceptions 312

5.6 Limits of Persuasive Engagement 318

6 Douglas's Racial Equality Charge 335

6.1 Lincolns Nonextension Position and Anti-slavery 336

6.2 Douglas on Abolition and Black Citizenship 367

6.3 From Nonextension to Emancipation 382

6.4 From Emancipation to Citizenship 406

6.5 Racism and Freedom 423

7 The Dred Scott Case 449

7.1 Legal Background of the Case 452

7.2 The Dred Scott Case in Court 466

7.3 Lincoln's Response 480

7.4 Douglas's Response 520

7.5 Conclusion 548

8 Aftershocks of the Debates 554

8.1 Southern Responses to the Freeport Doctrine 558

8.2 Douglass "Dividing Line" Doctrine 560

8.3 The Pamphlet War with Jeremiah Black 574

8.4 The 1859 Ohio "Lincoln-Douglas Debates" 579

8.5 The Cooper Union Speech 602

8.6 The First Inaugural Address 621

9 Coda: And the War Came 649

9.1 The Gettysburg Address 650

9.2 The Will of God Prevails 670

9.3 The Second Inaugural Address 684

Notes 709

Works Cited 775

Index 791

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See All Customer Reviews