Local Commons and Global Interdependence / Edition 1 available in Paperback
- Pub. Date:
- SAGE Publications
This volume offers a synthesis of what is known about very large and very small common-pool resources. Individuals using commons at the global or local level may find themselves in a similar situation. At an international level, states cannot appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce agreements they make to cooperate with one another. In some small-scale settings, participants may be just as helpless in calling on distant public officials to monitor and enforce their agreements. Scholars have independently discovered self-organizing regimes which rely on implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and procedures rather than the command and control of a central authority.
The contributors discuss the possibilities and
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.57(d)|
About the Author
Elinor Ostrom is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington. She was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2001; is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and a recipient of the Frank E. Seidman Prize in Political Economy and the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science. Her books include Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action; Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (with Roy Gardner and James Walker); and Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains (with Robert Keohane).
Table of Contents
Introduction - Robert O Keohane and Elinor OstromPART ONE: THEORETICAL PUZZLESThe Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships - Oran R YoungThe Politics of Scope - Duncan Snidal Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and InstitutionsHeterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems - Lisa L MartinPART TWO: EVIDENCE FROM THE LABORATORYHeterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution - Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley and James Walker Experimental Evidence on Sharing ContractsPART THREE: EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELDConstituting Social Capital and Collective Action - Elinor OstromThe Conditions for Successful Collective Action - Gary D LibecapSelf-interest and Environmental Management - Kenneth A Oye and James H MaxwellHeterogeneities at Two Levels - Ronald B Mitchell State, Non-state Actors and Intentional Oil Pollution