The theory of "Middle Knowledge" ascribes to God a particular type of knowledge - that he sees not simply what each free creature could do in any circumstance, but what it would do in any circumstance. This type of knowledge is claimed to be helpful to explain how God has perfect foreknowledge, while creatures are free. But is such a knowledge possible, even for God? The author argues that the arguments against it do not stand, and that therefore the theory of "Middle Knowledge" is tenable. The arguments against the coherence of "Middle Knowledge" are examined, of which the most important is that counterfactuals of freedom could not exist (chapter 2). Then the arguments against the adequacy of the theory of "Middle Knowledge" are examined, such as whether or not counterfactual power over the past is implied by the theory of "Middle Knowledge" (chapter 3). A separate chapter is devoted to 'background problems', such as the specific concept of freedom, the notion of God's concurrence, and our view on the nature of possible worlds (chapter 4).