Is linguistic meaning to be accounted for independently of the states of mind of language users, or can it only be explained in terms of them? If the latter, what account of the mental states in question avoids circularity? In this book Brian Loar offers a subtle and comprehensive theory that both preserves the natural priority of the mind in explanations of meaning, and gives an independent characterisation of its features. the nature of meaning and its relation to the mind is probably the area of paramount concern among philosophers. The theory presented here, by its reach and substance and the thoroughness and sophistication of its development, makes a major contribution to the debate.
Table of Contents
Introduction; 1. Propositional attitudes in the theory of mind; 2. Explicating attitude-ascriptions; 3. Functional theories; 4. How to interpret ascriptions of beliefs and desires; 5. Beliefs about particulars; 6. Objectively determinate beliefs and our knowledge of them; 7. Intentionality without intensions; 8. Why truth?; 9. Language and meaning; 10. Public language semantics; Index.