Moral Relativism And Moral Objectivity / Edition 1 available in Paperback
Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate,Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, andmoral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are likedisagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correctanswers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moralframework.Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to bethe case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues thatit is possible to find out the correct answers to some moralquestions. In her view, some moral disagreements are likedisagreements about whether the house has a ghost.Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, livelyaccessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moraltheory and meta-ethics.
About the Author
Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at the Universityof Princeton. His publications include Thought (1973),The Nature of Morality (1977), and Change in View(1986).
Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Her publications include TheRealm of Rights (1990), and Rights, Restitution and Risk(1986).
Table of Contents
Part I: Moral Relativism (Harman):.
1. Moral Relativism.
2. Social Contracts.
3. Expressing Basic Disagreement.
4. Universality of Practical Reasons?.
5. Judgements about Outsiders.
Part II: Moral Objectivity (Thomson):.
6. Epistemological Arguments for Moral Skepticism.
8. Evaluations and Directives.
Part III: Responses:.
9. Harman's Response to Thomson's Part II.
10. Thomson's Response to Harman's Part I.