In March 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the formation of the Alliance for Progress, a program dedicated to creating prosperous, socially just, democratic societies throughout Latin America. Over the next few years, the United States spent nearly $20 billion in pursuit of the Alliance's goals, but Latin American economies barely grew, Latin American societies remained inequitable, and sixteen extraconstitutional changes of government rocked the region. In this close, critical analysis, Stephen Rabe explains why Kennedy's grand plan for Latin America proved such a signal policy failure.Drawing on recently declassified materials, Rabe investigates the nature of Kennedy's intense anti-Communist crusade and explores the convictions that drove him to fight the Cold War throughout the Caribbean and Latin Americaa region he repeatedly referred to as "the most dangerous area in the world." As Rabe acknowledges, Kennedy remains popular in the United States and Latin America, in part for the noble purposes behind the Alliance for Progress. But an unwavering determination to wage Cold War led Kennedy to compromise, even mutilate, those grand goals.
|Publisher:||The University of North Carolina Press|
|Product dimensions:||6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.70(d)|
About the Author
Stephen G. Rabe, professor of history at the University of Texas at Dallas, is author of the prize-winning Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism.
Table of Contents
2. Gunboat Diplomacy
3. Destabilization Policies
4. The Kennedy Doctrine
5. Constitutional Defenses
6. Counterinsurgency Doctrines
7. Alliance for Progress
What People are Saying About This
The best detailed, overall account we have of the much-discussed Kennedy policies toward Latin America....[Rabe's argument that] Kennedy's obsession with the Cold War 'mutilated' his good intentions toward the southern hemisphere should help shape the ongoing, often intense, debate over Kennedy and the pivotal U.S. policies in the 1960's.
This is the best detailed, overall account we have of the much-discussed Kennedy policies toward Latin America. Well-written, based on exhaustive use of U.S. sources, this account makes an argumentKennedy's obsession with the Cold War 'mutilated' his good intentions toward the southern hemispherethat should help shape the ongoing, often intense, debate over Kennedy and the pivotal U.S. policies in the 1960s.Walter LaFeber, Cornell University