National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War

The Cold War has been over for ten years and no country threatens this nation's existence, yet, we still spend billions of dollars on covert action and espionage. Even during the Cold War, when intelligence was seen as a matter of life and death, our system served us badly. It provided unreliable information (leading, among other things, to a grossly inflated military budget) as it supported corrupt regimes around the world, promoted the drug trade, and repeatedly violated foreign and domestic laws. And worse, proceed in a shroud of secrecy, it paid no price for its mistakes, but instead grew larger and more insulated and in drastic need of reform.

In National Insecurity ten prominent experts describe, from an insider perspective, what went wrong with U.S. intelligence and what needs to be done to fix it. Drawing on their experience in government administration, research, and the foreign service, they propose a radical rethinking of the United States' intelligence needs in the post-Cold War world. In addition, they offer a coherent and unified plan for reform that can protect U.S. Security while upholding the values of our democratic system.

The contributors include Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State, advisor to President Kennedy, and author of The Cuban Missile Crisis; Melvin A. Goodman, former division chief and senior analyst at the CIA's Office of Soviet Affairs; Robert E. White, former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay and president of the Center for International Policy; Robert V. Keeley, former ambassador to Greece, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius; Jack A. Blum, chief investigator for Senator Church's Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for the Senate investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal; Kate Doyle, analyst at the National Security Archive; Alfred W. McCoy, author of The Politics of Heroin; Robert Dreyfuss, a journalist who publishes regularly on intelligence matters; Richard A. Stubbing, who for twenty years handled the intelligence budget for the Office of Management and Budget; Pat M. Holt, former chief of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and author of Secret Intelligence and Public Policy; and the editor.

About the Author:

Craig Eisendrath is Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C. He served as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer.

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National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War

The Cold War has been over for ten years and no country threatens this nation's existence, yet, we still spend billions of dollars on covert action and espionage. Even during the Cold War, when intelligence was seen as a matter of life and death, our system served us badly. It provided unreliable information (leading, among other things, to a grossly inflated military budget) as it supported corrupt regimes around the world, promoted the drug trade, and repeatedly violated foreign and domestic laws. And worse, proceed in a shroud of secrecy, it paid no price for its mistakes, but instead grew larger and more insulated and in drastic need of reform.

In National Insecurity ten prominent experts describe, from an insider perspective, what went wrong with U.S. intelligence and what needs to be done to fix it. Drawing on their experience in government administration, research, and the foreign service, they propose a radical rethinking of the United States' intelligence needs in the post-Cold War world. In addition, they offer a coherent and unified plan for reform that can protect U.S. Security while upholding the values of our democratic system.

The contributors include Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State, advisor to President Kennedy, and author of The Cuban Missile Crisis; Melvin A. Goodman, former division chief and senior analyst at the CIA's Office of Soviet Affairs; Robert E. White, former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay and president of the Center for International Policy; Robert V. Keeley, former ambassador to Greece, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius; Jack A. Blum, chief investigator for Senator Church's Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for the Senate investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal; Kate Doyle, analyst at the National Security Archive; Alfred W. McCoy, author of The Politics of Heroin; Robert Dreyfuss, a journalist who publishes regularly on intelligence matters; Richard A. Stubbing, who for twenty years handled the intelligence budget for the Office of Management and Budget; Pat M. Holt, former chief of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and author of Secret Intelligence and Public Policy; and the editor.

About the Author:

Craig Eisendrath is Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C. He served as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer.

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Overview

The Cold War has been over for ten years and no country threatens this nation's existence, yet, we still spend billions of dollars on covert action and espionage. Even during the Cold War, when intelligence was seen as a matter of life and death, our system served us badly. It provided unreliable information (leading, among other things, to a grossly inflated military budget) as it supported corrupt regimes around the world, promoted the drug trade, and repeatedly violated foreign and domestic laws. And worse, proceed in a shroud of secrecy, it paid no price for its mistakes, but instead grew larger and more insulated and in drastic need of reform.

In National Insecurity ten prominent experts describe, from an insider perspective, what went wrong with U.S. intelligence and what needs to be done to fix it. Drawing on their experience in government administration, research, and the foreign service, they propose a radical rethinking of the United States' intelligence needs in the post-Cold War world. In addition, they offer a coherent and unified plan for reform that can protect U.S. Security while upholding the values of our democratic system.

The contributors include Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State, advisor to President Kennedy, and author of The Cuban Missile Crisis; Melvin A. Goodman, former division chief and senior analyst at the CIA's Office of Soviet Affairs; Robert E. White, former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay and president of the Center for International Policy; Robert V. Keeley, former ambassador to Greece, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius; Jack A. Blum, chief investigator for Senator Church's Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for the Senate investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal; Kate Doyle, analyst at the National Security Archive; Alfred W. McCoy, author of The Politics of Heroin; Robert Dreyfuss, a journalist who publishes regularly on intelligence matters; Richard A. Stubbing, who for twenty years handled the intelligence budget for the Office of Management and Budget; Pat M. Holt, former chief of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and author of Secret Intelligence and Public Policy; and the editor.

About the Author:

Craig Eisendrath is Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C. He served as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781566398480
Publisher: Temple University Press
Publication date: 07/31/2000
Pages: 241
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.80(d)

Table of Contents

Forewordvii
Introduction1
1After the Cold War: The Need for Intelligence8
2Espionage and Covert Action23
3Too Many Spies, Too Little Intelligence45
4CIA-Foreign Service Relations61
5Covert Operations: The Blowback Problem76
6The End of Secrecy: U.S. National Security and the New Openness Movement92
7Mission Myopia: Narcotics as Fallout From the CIA's Covert Wars118
8Techint: The NSA, the NRO, and NIMA149
9Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Funding172
10Who's Watching the Store? Executive-Branch and Congressional Surveillance190
Conclusions212
Selected Bibliography223
About The Center for International Policy227
About the Contributors231
Index233
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