The ongoing efforts in the Global War on Terror have shown how modern insurgents and terrorists have made ample use of transnational sanctuaries to undermine efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Counter insurgent forces are reluctant to conduct overt strikes against these sanctuaries for fear of conflict escalation and information operations ramifications. These concerns combine to prevent US action and as such, transnational sanctuaries continue to undermine the success of COIN operations in adjacent countries. What then can the United States do in response to problem posed by transnational sanctuaries? One proposed solution is for unilateral strikes against these sanctuaries. Advocates on this position believe that by simply attacking the insurgents in these transnational sanctuaries the U.S. can deal the insurgency a deathblow and obtain strategic victory. This oversimplification ignores the historical experience of other countries. This paper will the examine the Republic of South Africa's (RSA) substantial use of cross-border operations in support of its counterinsurgency in Namibia as a case study of how to effectively employ cross-border operations to set the conditions for strategic victory. The South African experience shows that successful cross-border operations of themselves do not guarantee victory. Cross-border attacks not linked to the overall COIN efforts to reduce popular support for the insurgency are counterproductive. Such military centric attacks may decrease the legitimacy of the government conducting the counterinsurgency and undermine long-term strategic goals of the campaign.
