During the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals," respected naval leaders lobbied for the Navy's role in the new era. Arthur Radford and Arleigh Burke, who eventually became the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chief of naval operations respectively, as well as Chief of Naval Operations Louis E. Denfeld risked their careers to speak out in support of enabling aircraft carriers to transport, target, and deliver nuclear weapons. In Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, Jerry Miller traces this struggle, which also involved serious conflicts with the Air Force and ultimately led to innovations in the design and engineering of carriers and aircraft.
Miller demonstrates the success of the Navy's nuclear vision, which saved the aircraft carrier from extinction, and argues that the Navy's hard-won nuclear capability played a significant role in ending the Cold War. In the final chapter, he reflects on this history and its participants, and he assesses the future of both the aircraft carrier and nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 1. The Beginning Chapter 3 2. Policy and Strategy Chapter 4 3. Weapons Chapter 5 4. Heavy Attack Chapter 6 5. Light Attack Chapter 7 6. Delivery Tactics Chapter 8 7. Ships Chapter 9 8. Testing the Capability Chapter 10 9. Targeting Chapter 11 10. The Past, the Present, and the Future Chapter 12 11. Reflections
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
This survey of U.S. naval aviation and nuclear weapons is at its best when Adm. Miller talks about the travails the active squadrons went through in terms of generating an operational capability, closely followed by some of the doubts the author vents about the misguided (in his view) mystification the nuclear apparartus erected around the weapons themselves. Miller goes so far as to suggest that for a major power nuclear weapons are almost an obsolete capability.What I don't quite buy is the notion that the effort to create a functional nuclear capacity saved U.S. naval aviation, as any of the other naval air missions were mostly land-based anyway. While an interesting counterfactual, I'm not convinced that Miller has quite enough evidence to make this outcome seem plausible.