Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation

Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation

by Jerry Miller


$25.72 $32.95 Save 22% Current price is $25.72, Original price is $32.95. You Save 22%.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781560989448
Publisher: Smithsonian Institution Press
Publication date: 04/17/2001
Series: History of Aviation Series
Pages: 296
Product dimensions: 6.31(w) x 9.32(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Formerly commander of the U.S. Second Fleet and NATO striking forces in the Atlantic as well as the U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO striking forces in the Mediterranean, Jerry Miller retired from the U.S. Navy in 1974. He spent most of his thirty-eight-year career as a fixed-wing pilot, seeing surface combat in a cruiser in the Pacific during World War II, becoming a fighter pilot and a commander of a fighter squadron during the Korean War, and commanding a carrier division during the Vietnam War. Since his retirement from active duty, Miller has used his extensive Navy experience in nuclear weapons targeting and delivery to serve as a national security consultant on arms control.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 1. The Beginning Chapter 3 2. Policy and Strategy Chapter 4 3. Weapons Chapter 5 4. Heavy Attack Chapter 6 5. Light Attack Chapter 7 6. Delivery Tactics Chapter 8 7. Ships Chapter 9 8. Testing the Capability Chapter 10 9. Targeting Chapter 11 10. The Past, the Present, and the Future Chapter 12 11. Reflections

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See All Customer Reviews

Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation 3 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 1 reviews.
Shrike58 on LibraryThing 7 months ago
This survey of U.S. naval aviation and nuclear weapons is at its best when Adm. Miller talks about the travails the active squadrons went through in terms of generating an operational capability, closely followed by some of the doubts the author vents about the misguided (in his view) mystification the nuclear apparartus erected around the weapons themselves. Miller goes so far as to suggest that for a major power nuclear weapons are almost an obsolete capability.What I don't quite buy is the notion that the effort to create a functional nuclear capacity saved U.S. naval aviation, as any of the other naval air missions were mostly land-based anyway. While an interesting counterfactual, I'm not convinced that Miller has quite enough evidence to make this outcome seem plausible.