- Pub. Date:
- Cambridge University Press
This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links that can be made between the two. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students, and will also be of interest to cognitive scientists, psychologists, and philosophers of biology.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Series:||Cambridge Studies in Philosophy Series|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.71(d)|
Table of Contents
Part I. Knowledge: 1. Conclusive reasons; 2. Epistemic operators; 3. The pragmatic dimension of knowledge; 4. The epistemology of belief; 5. Two conceptions of knowledge: rational vs. reliable belief; Part II. Perception and Experience: 6. Simple seeing; 7. Conscious experience; 8. Differences that make no difference; 9. The mind's awareness of itself; 10. What good is consciousness; Part III. Thought and Intentionality: 11. Putting information to work; 12. If you can't make one, you don't know how it works; 13. The nature of thought; 14. Norms and the constitution of the mental; 15. Minds, machines, and money: what really explains behavior.