ISBN-10:
0199580170
ISBN-13:
9780199580170
Pub. Date:
06/18/2010
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Persons, Interests, and Justice

Persons, Interests, and Justice

by Nils Holtug

Hardcover

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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780199580170
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Publication date: 06/18/2010
Pages: 352
Product dimensions: 6.30(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.10(d)

About the Author

Nils Holtug is Director of the Centre for the Study of Equality and Multiculturalism and Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction 1

1.1 Self-interest, Morality, and Justice 1

1.2 A More Detailed Overview of the Book 2

1.3 Methodology 7

1.4 Thought Experiments 10

1.5 Contrast Arguments and Transitivity 12

Part I Prudence

2 Self-interest 17

2.1 Self-interest and Morality 17

2.2 On What Self-interest Is 19

2.3 The Identity View 25

2.4 The Present Preference View 28

2.5 The Actual Preference View 38

2.6 The Necessary Preference View 41

2.7 The Present Preference for Survival View 45

2.8 Preferences, Goals, and Futility 51

2.9 The Consciousness View 53

2.10 Summary and a Look Ahead 56

3 Personal Identity 58

3.1 Personal Identity, Self-interest, and Morality 58

3.2 Two Concepts of Identity 59

3.3 Two Senses of What Matters in Survival 64

3.4 Theories of Personal Identity Over Time 69

3.5 Why Identity is Not What Matters in Survival 73

3.6 Survival, Existence, and the Only X and Y Principle 76

3.7 Division and Indeterminacy 80

3.8 Other Values 82

3.9 Summary and a Look Ahead 83

4 What Matters 85

4.1 Survival, Division, and What Matters 85

4.2 The Asymmetrical Division Test 86

4.3 The Psycho-physical View of What Matters 88

4.4 Justifying a View of What Matters 95

4.5 The Argument for Discounting 100

4.6 The Prudential View 103

4.7 Who Are the Bearers of Self-interest? 111

4.8 M-relativity 114

4.9 On the Value of Having Multiple Continuers 116

4.10 The Repugnant Conclusion about Self-interest 120

4.11 The Additive Function 123

4.12 Disturbing Irrelevant Factors 123

4.13 Summary and a Look Ahead 127

5 On the Value of Coming into Existence 129

5.1 The Value of Existence View 129

5.2 The Argument for the Value of Existence View 131

5.3 The Identifiability Objection 134

5.4 On the Logic of Betterness 137

5.5 Metaphysics 139

5.6 Actual, Possible, and Contingent People 143

5.7 Frustrationism 144

5.8 An Alternative Defence 146

5.9 The Value of Existence View and Self-interests 148

5.10 Summary and a Look Ahead 150

Part II Justice

6 Welfarism 153

6.1 Welfare, Morality, and Justice 153

6.2 Outcome Welfarism 155

6.3 Person-affecting Outcome Welfarism 156

6.4 On the Virtues of a Person-affecting Approach 162

6.5 Welfarism and Beyond 163

6.6 Impartiality 165

6.7 Summary and a Look Ahead 167

7 Egalitarianism 169

7.1 Welfare and Justice 169

7.2 Egalitarianism 170

7.3 The Value of Equality 179

7.4 The Levelling Down Objection 181

7.5 The Strong Wide Person-affecting Principle 184

7.6 Possible People and Moral Ideals 188

7.7 Conditional Egalitarianism 193

7.8 Racial Segregation and Levelling Down 199

7.9 Summary and a Look Ahead 200

8 Prioritarianism 202

8.1 From Equality to Priority 202

8.2 Prioritarianism 204

8.3 Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection 209

8.4 Impersonal and Person-affecting Values 213

8.5 Relational Justice 218

8.6 Overall Outcome Welfare Leximin 221

8.7 Outcome Welfare Suffcientarianism 226

8.8 Aggregation 235

8.9 Moral Standing 238

8.10 Summary and a Look Ahead 242

9 Population Ethics 244

9.1 Future Generations 244

9.2 Person-affecting Moralities 247

9.3 Prioritarianism and the Repugnant Conclusion 252

9.4 Additive and Non-additive Functions 259

9.5 The Necessary-person-affecting Principle 263

9.6 Generocentrism 267

9.7 The Actual-person-affecting Principle 270

9.8 Personalism 272

9.9 Pluralist Prioritarianism and Transitivity 277

9.10 Reconsidering Our Intuitions 280

9.11 Should We Accept the Repugnant Conclusion? 283

9.12 Summary and a Look Ahead 287

10 Metaphysics and Justice 290

10.1 Prudence and Morality 290

10.2 Expanding the Scope of Morality 292

10.3 Prudence and Priority 295

10.4 Metaphysics and Distribution-sensitivity 297

10.5 The Compensation Argument 302

10.6 Prudential Prioritarianism 308

10.7 The Temporal Unit of Distributive Concern 316

10.8 Psychological Differences 325

10 9 Psychological Changes 329

10.10 Prudential Prioritarianism and the Badness of Death 330

10.11 Prudential Prioritarianism and Impersonal Values 335

10.12 Prudential Prioritarianism and Welfarism 338

10.13 Summary 339

Bibliography 341

Index 353

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