- Pub. Date:
- Cambridge University Press
This is the third volume of Hilary Putnam's philosophical papers, published in paperback for the first time. The volume contains his major essays from 1975 to 1982, which reveal a large shift in emphasis in the 'realist' position developed in his earlier work. While not renouncing those views, Professor Putnam has continued to explore their epistemological consequences and conceptual history. He now, crucially, sees theories of truth and of meaning that derive from a firm notion of reference as inadequate.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.75(d)|
Table of Contents
Introduction; 1. Models and reality; 2. Equivalence; 3. Possibility and necessity; 4. Reference and truth; 5. "two dogmas' revisited; 6. There is at least one a priori truth; 7. Analyticity and apriority: beyond Wittgenstein and Quine; 8. Computational psychology and interpretation theory; 9. Reflections on Goodman's Ways of Worldmaking; 10. Convention: a theme in philosophy; 11. Philosophers and human understanding; 12. Why there isn't a ready-made world; 13. Why reason can't be naturalized; 14. Quantum mechanics and the observer; 15. Vaguenes and alternative logic; 16. Beyond historicism; Bibliography; Acknowledgements; Index.