Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact / Edition 1

Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact / Edition 1

by Mark J. Roe
ISBN-10:
0199205302
ISBN-13:
9780199205301
Pub. Date:
09/21/2006
Publisher:
Oxford University Press, USA

Paperback

View All Available Formats & Editions
Current price is , Original price is $55.0. You
Select a Purchase Option (New Edition)
  • purchase options
    $46.75 $55.00 Save 15% Current price is $46.75, Original price is $55. You Save 15%.
  • purchase options

Overview

Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact / Edition 1

The political and social predicates that make the large firm possible and that shape its form are not always taken into account, despite the fact that variation in the political and social environment can deeply affect which firms, which ownership structures, and which governance arrangements survive and prosper. Focussing on the US, the larger nations in continental Europe, and Japan, Mark Roe uses statistical and qualitative analyses to explore the relationship between politics, history, and business organization.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780199205301
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Publication date: 09/21/2006
Series: Clarendon Lectures in Management Studies Series
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 256
Product dimensions: 9.10(w) x 6.10(h) x 0.60(d)

About the Author

Mark J. Roe is Berg Professor Law at the Harvard Law School. He has previously held positions at Columbia University School of Law; University of Pennsylvania School of Law; and Rutgers University School of Law. His publications include Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials (Foundation Press, 2000) and Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 1994).

Table of Contents

List of Graphs and Figuresxi
List of Tablesxii
Introduction1
Part IPolitical Conflict and the Corporation11
1.Peace as Predicate13
2.The Wealthy West's Differing Corporate Governance Structures16
3.A General Theory21
Part IISocial Conflict and the Institutions of Corporate Governance27
4.Social Democracies and Agency Costs: Raising the Stakes29
5.Reducing Shareholders' Power to Control Managers38
Part IIILeft-Right Politics and Ownership Separation: Data47
6.Data and Confirmation49
Part IVNation by Nation63
7.France65
8.Germany71
9.Italy83
10.Japan87
11.Sweden94
12.United Kingdom98
13.United States104
14.Extending the Sample?106
Part VThe Direction of Causality109
15.Alternative Formulations of the Thesis111
16.Backlash116
17.Contract as Metaphor123
18.Rents125
19.Rents and Politics134
20.Rents and Ownership Concentration142
21.Political Change in Continental Europe150
22.Alternative Formulations: Data154
Part VICorporate Law's Limits159
23.Corporate Law as the Foundation for Securities Markets: The Theory161
24.Its Limits: Theory168
25.Its Limits: Data183
26.The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits194
Part VIIUnifying Two Political Theories197
27.Populism and Socialism in Corporate Governance199
Conclusion201
Acknowledgements205
Bibliography207
Index221

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See All Customer Reviews