Politics (Barnes & Noble Library of Essential Reading)

by Aristotle, Amit Hagar (Introduction), Benjamin Jowett (Translator)

Overview

Aristotles Politics is one of the earliest, and at the same time one of the most thorough and balanced, accounts of politics. It provides extended analyses of the origin and function of the state; the proper distribution of political power among the branches of government; a classification of the different types of regime; the reasons why the different regimes fail and how to prevent such failure; and, in general, the principal details of practical politics. In this respect, it is a primer on government as valuable today as it was when first written.

The greatest contribution of the Politics, however, lies in its establishment of the fundamental principles underlying these details-the political significance of human nature and rationality; the relation of the human good to the political good; the critical difference between politics and economics; and the true justification for political authority and power. At the very least, Aristotles Politics is a reminder that government, both in theory and practice, needs to have its foundation and justification in broader understandings of man, of nature, and of the purpose of political life.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781411428935
Publisher:	Barnes & Noble
Publication date:	09/01/2009
Series:	Barnes & Noble Library of Essential Reading
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	288
Sales rank:	624,604
File size:	801 KB
Age Range:	3 Months to 18 Years

About the Author

Born in 384 BC in Stagira, Macedonia, Aristotle was the son of a physician in the royal court. At a young age, he went to study at Platos Academy, where he began to develop many of the ideas that would become a part of his philosophical, scientific, and political systems. Aristotles philosophy has shaped the thinking of writers for centuries. His writings are among the most profound expression of the thinking of the classical Greek era.

Introduction

The importance of Aristotle's Politics is impossible to overstate. It is one of the earliest, and at the same time one of the most thorough and balanced, accounts of politics in the history of political thought. It provides extended analyses of the origin and function of the state; the proper distribution of political power among the branches of government; a classification of the different types of regime; the reasons why the different regimes fail and how to prevent such failure; and, in general, the principal details of practical politics. In this respect, it is a primer on government as valuable today as it was when first written. The greatest contribution of the Politics, however, lies in its establishment of the fundamental principles underlying these details-the political significance of human nature and rationality; the relation of the human good to the political good; the critical difference between politics and economics; and the true justification for political authority and power. Today, with liberal democracy being the dominant paradigm of political organization, the significance of the Politics is somewhat obscured. However, perhaps for this very reason, it must be read as a counterpoint to contemporary views about the nature of political life. The principles of consent, political participation, and the rights of the individual are modern ideas that were not always accepted as obvious. To the extent that today their truth is assumed without question or qualification, there is a danger that too great an emphasis on these principles will forever eclipse classical ideas about politics that, in the past, were thought to be essential to any conceptionof political life and to the construction of a just political system. A familiarity with the principles of the Politics is an important safeguard against this danger. For, while it acknowledges the importance of the rule of law, the voice of the people, and the social need for security and stability-all basic democratic ideals-it does so in the context of a discussion that goes far beyond these ultimately narrow political concerns. At the very least, Aristotle's Politics is a reminder that government, both in theory and practice, needs to have its foundation and justification in broader understandings of man, of nature, and of the purpose of political life.

Aristotle himself is a philosopher arguably without parallel in the Western tradition. The extent of his influence is difficult to measure; however, it is unquestioned that his work shaped the thinking of writers for centuries following its first appearance. His writings (together with those of Plato) are the most profound expression of the thinking of the classical Greek era. In the Roman period, too, many writers owe a debt to him. Cicero, for example, made great use of Aristotelian principles in his philosophical and political writings, as did Plutarch in his ethics. During the Middle Ages, Aristotle's ideas were essential to the numerous attempts made at that time to reconcile the worlds of philosophy and religion. Avicenna and Averroës tried to integrate Aristotelian principles with Islamic theology; Maimonides made a similar attempt with Judaism; and, most famously, Saint Thomas Aquinas did so with Christianity. In each of these attempts, especially that of Aquinas (who referred to Aristotle as "The Philosopher," as if there were no other), Aristotle's natural philosophy and "rationalist" principles were instrumental in the articulation and explanation of the "super"-natural and revealed truths of religion.

Moreover, Aristotle's influence can be felt in virtually every field, from philosophy to the empirical sciences. He introduced many of the terms and categories that have been fundamental ever since in discussions of metaphysics. His logic was the standard until the development of modern logic by Boole and Frege in the nineteenth century and by Russell and Whitehead in the twentieth. His influence in biology, botany, and anatomy lasted into the Renaissance, when advances in physics and biology began to supplant many of his scientific systems. In aesthetics, his discussions of art and poetry in the Poetics are still used to teach drama and playwriting. In each of these disciplines, Aristotle established the framework of discussion-and this, not simply because he was the first, in many cases, to write extended treatises on these subjects, but because of his systematic method and because of the breadth and thoroughness of his analyses.

Born in 384 BC in Stagira, Macedonia, Aristotle was the son of a physician in the royal court. At a young age, he went to study at Plato's Academy, where he began to develop many of the ideas that would become a part of his philosophical, scientific, and political systems. There is a close relation between his work and that of Plato, although his own opinion of Plato's writings is sometimes quite ambiguous. In a number of his major works, including the Politics, he presents powerful critiques of his teacher. However, these are, for the most part, not comprehensive repudiations of Plato's views, but are rather objections to specific arguments or refinements of positions with which he is in basic agreement. An analysis of his arguments often reveals a fundamental similarity between the two philosophers. It is in his metaphysics where he, perhaps, differs most widely from Plato. Even here, however, the difference is not as great as it might appear on the surface, although the Aristotelian position is a substantive modification of the Platonic. His political ideas, too, are modifications of Plato's; but, in this case, their affinity is more obvious. He clearly shares with Plato, for example, a belief in the importance of human reason, both as the theoretical foundation of any explanation of political life, and as the most fundamental principle of political organization. His description of the conceptual relation between the individual soul and the "soul" of the city (or polis) bears a close resemblance to Plato's; as does his understanding of the human good and the purpose of political life, and his critique of democracy that grows out of that understanding.

Like Plato, too, his interest in politics was not entirely theoretical. In 367 BC, Plato had attempted to put his political ideas into practice by becoming tutor to Dionysius the Younger, the ruler of Syracuse. Similarly, Aristotle, after Plato's death in 347 BC, left the Academy and went to Asia Minor to become tutor to Hermias, king of Assos, whose niece he eventually married. And, more famously, around 347 BC, he is thought to have become tutor to the Macedonian king's son, Alexander (later Alexander the Great). These attempts to bring together philosophy and political rule were largely unsuccessful. But Aristotle's primary focus was, in any case, philosophical; he was more interested in teaching and in developing his own ideas than he was in being directly involved in politics. So, when Alexander became king, Aristotle went back to Athens and founded his own school, the Lyceum, where he taught until the year before he died in 322 BC, one year after the death of Alexander.

When Aristotle was born, the Persian wars had been over for almost a century; and the Peloponnesian war with Sparta, which resulted in the defeat of Athens and brought to a close the era of Athenian empire, had ended in 404 BC. After a brief period in which Athens was ruled as an oligarchy by a group known as the Thirty Tyrants, democracy was restored in 403 BC and lasted for several decades until the rise of Alexander the Great. Thus, the Athens of Aristotle's early years, including much of the time that he was studying at the Academy, was a democratic city-state; and, in his later years, it was part of the Macedonian empire. Aristotle was, therefore, personally familiar with political rule in most of its variations, and his political writing reflects that familiarity. The Politics is grounded in his historical knowledge and exhaustive empirical examination of the contemporary political forms. Although, ultimately, there is a metaphysical foundation to his political system, Aristotle's investigative method is inductive, at least to the extent that the general conclusions that substantiate his theoretical claims are drawn from this sort of empirical and historical examination. In this respect, Aristotle is often thought to be the first political scientist. As such, his purpose is not merely to outline an ideal political regime. For Aristotle, an equally, if not more, important object is the provision of a detailed elaboration of the advantages and disadvantages of regimes in real circumstances. His discussion of the ideal, which is central to his political theory, must be understood with a view toward the establishment of an actual political system.

In many of his writings, Aristotle begins with the statement of a general proposition or definition, which (as indicated above) he later clarifies and defends using empirical evidence and historical example. In the case of the Politics, Aristotle begins with the assertion that the city, or polis, is a kind of association; and that, as such, it exists in order to achieve some good. This good is not simply the preservation of order or the protection of property, although it might include and perhaps even presupposes those goods. However, these are material ends, and Aristotle's claim is that the polis exists not merely for the sake of life but rather for the sake of the good life; or, as he will say at the end of the Politics, for happiness. The good life and happiness, then, are to be understood as involving something beyond the acquisition and possession of material goods. On the contrary, the good life for a man is related to the life of a good man; that is, the life of someone who is properly speaking a man. For Aristotle, then, since it is necessary to discover what a man is properly speaking, the appropriate starting point for an analysis of the political association is the delineation of a theory of human nature.

One of Aristotle's more familiar principles is that man is by nature a political animal. This means that man is the sort of animal whose nature is not fully realized outside of the polis. Since reason is what specifically characterizes man's nature, since this is what distinguishes him from other animals, man is most properly defined in terms of his rationality and not just on the basis of his outward human form (or genetic makeup, as scientists might say today). Thus man, in addition to being a political animal, is a rational animal. However, whereas other animals become what they naturally are in the course of their development, man does not. A caterpillar, for example, in the absence of external environmental factors that might prevent it, will develop into a butterfly simply because of its internal makeup. An infant human being, by contrast, although he might grow into something with the outward appearance of a man, will not out of any natural necessity become a rational animal. There must be some external factor in addition to the internal principle to assist in the development of human rationality. It is for this reason that Aristotle argues that man is not self-sufficient. An individual man depends, in some fundamental way, on his interrelation with other individuals like him. Aristotle's claim is not merely that an individual, as a practical matter, cannot survive without the assistance of others. More important, a human being in isolation cannot become fully human at all. Only in the polis is man's nature realized. Only in political life is the good life for man achieved. In this sense, the most fundamental reason for the existence of the polis is to establish an environment in which individual human beings will be able to develop into rational animals. Moreover, it must contribute substantively to that development.

The understanding of the polis as an association directed toward the human good and human happiness, and instrumental in the formation of good human beings, is the central idea that characterizes Aristotelian political theory. In many ways, it is this idea that distinguishes the classical view of politics from the modern. One important corollary of this idea is that, since the polis is a natural outgrowth of human needs, both material and non-material, it must itself have a natural existence. That is, it cannot be merely a product of human art and ingenuity. If it were so, then a man would be by nature an isolated being, having no goals or ends that he naturally shares with others of his kind. This seems empirically false, since every political association appears to be bound together by a set of shared interests-which include (implicitly or explicitly) beliefs about the purpose of the political association; the role that government should play in achieving that purpose; and, at the most abstract level, the nature of man, human rationality, and the human good. It is this set of shared interests that makes the political association a community and not simply a collection of naturally isolated individuals who happen to live in the same place. This is why Aristotle believes that friendship is central to political life. Friends are individuals who like the same things and have the same interests. That is, they agree about what is good. Political associations are communities of individuals who are friends in this sense; and the beliefs about what is good are shared by the individuals who make up the community, and not imposed from above by a ruling class or a king. Where they are so imposed, there is no true political association.

This raises the question of what form a true political association should take. Who is entitled to rule (or, as Aristotle says, who is entitled to share in the honors and offices of the polis)? What is a just distribution of political power? And what relation should exist between the rulers and the ruled? Aristotle's answers to these questions about the nature of and justification for political rule return to his conception of man as a rational animal. His argument begins from the principle of natural slavery, one of the aspects of his political system that appears most unpalatable in the modern view. To Aristotle, however, in order for rule of any kind to be justified, it must be possible in principle to distinguish between one who is naturally suited to rule and one who is naturally suited to be ruled. Without such a distinction, the justification for rule would necessarily reduce to the question of power. Most people today reject the idea of the natural slave. Modern liberal theorists attempt to resolve the problem of political right by replacing it with the idea of consent. This resolution, however, does not ultimately address Aristotle's objection. To begin with, the principle of consent is not an unambiguous one. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine when political rule has been authorized by consent, or precisely what consent has authorized. And even were this made clear, as a practical matter authority could only be based on the consent of the majority, which is nothing more than an expression of the power of the greater number. Aristotle argues that, in order for political authority to go beyond the principle of "might makes right," the entitlement to share in the honors and offices of the polis must rest on some natural foundation.

In Aristotle's view, given the relation between the political association and the nature of man, that foundation must be human reason. A man is rational depending upon the degree to which his reason rules his appetites. The slave, by contrast, is defined by the fact that, although he may "apprehend" reason in others, he does not "participate" in it himself. To the extent that he has not sufficient reason to rule his appetites, he can never be rational in the proper sense; and his good is better served when he is ruled by someone who is properly rational. In general, the principle of natural slavery serves to distinguish those who are suited to rule from those who are suited to be ruled. The best political association, then, is one in which reason rules in the city; that is, those who are capable of self-rule, those who are ruled by reason, are entitled to share in the honors and offices of the polis. This can be the only justification for political authority.

For Aristotle, however, human rationality is not simply the basis for making political authority legitimate; it also suggests the form that authority should take. The implication of the discussion of natural slavery is that proper political rule is the rule of a good man over his inferiors; or, where there are a number of good men, the rule of these few over the rest. The rule of the master over his slave is like that of the soul over the body, since the slave is by definition incapable of self-rule in the same way that a body without a soul is inanimate. But, according to Aristotle, proper political rule is not like that of a master over his slave, since the rule of the "statesman" is characterized by the rule of reason over the appetites, and there is a sense in which the appetites contribute to the rule of reason in a way that the slave cannot contribute to the rule of the master. The ideal regime is, rather, one in which the more rational rule over the less rational, not in any authoritarian manner, but always with a view toward the good of rulers and ruled alike, and always with some participation in the determination of that public good by those who are ruled. Where there is an individual who is substantively more rational than all the rest, the political association should have the form of a monarchy. However, where there are many individuals who are equally rational, it should have the form of an aristocracy, wherein the best men "rule and are ruled in turn."

The specifics of how ordinary individuals "participate" in this ideal regime are never spelled out in the Politics. But a suggestion of how they might do so is made when Aristotle takes up the question as to which is the best regime in practice. This secondary question is, in some ways, more significant than the question of which is the best regime absolutely, since for Aristotle the ideal is used primarily as a measure of the goodness of actual political associations. The practical question is, if anything, more complex than the theoretical question; and it is in attempting to describe the most practicable regime that Aristotle makes most use of his empirical method. On the one hand, it is a question of justice: How should political power be distributed? This is a matter of determining who should be a citizen of the polis, since to Aristotle a citizen is not merely someone who is "born of citizen parents on both sides," but one who is, more importantly, "entitled to share in deliberative or judicial office." On the other hand, the practical question is little more than a question of determining which regime is likely to survive the longest, regardless of the circumstances. Or, in other words, which regime is the most stable?

In answering these questions, Aristotle argues that the honors and offices of the polis can be distributed in a number of ways: (1) on the basis of free birth, as in a democracy; (2) on the basis of wealth or property, as in an oligarchy; (3) on the basis of excellence or goodness, as in an aristocracy or monarchy; or (4) on the basis of some combination of the three. His discussion focuses around the problem of whether to give ruling authority to the people, to the propertied, or to the few good men (or, in the extreme, the one good man). On the basis of his earlier argument that the rule of reason is best, it would seem to be inappropriate to give authority to the wealthy or to the people. This is why the ideal regime is aristocratic. However, there was a suggestion, even at the theoretical level, that those who are not entirely rational should be able to contribute in some way; and there is a sense in which both the wealthy few and the many poor have a legitimate claim to political authority. Their interests need to be taken into account in some way, both as a matter of justice and as a matter of order. The wealthy have legitimate vested interests in the political association; and the poor, taken together, in certain instances have a greater political wisdom even than a small group of more rational individuals. The problem is compounded further by the possibility that the rule of law might be better than all the rest.

In practice, therefore, Aristotle argues that some kind of mixed regime (what he calls "constitutional" government) is the best. Such a regime should be basically aristocratic in form and be guided by established laws, to which the rulers and ruled are equally subject. But, in addition, this regime should allow the interests of both the wealthy and the poor to be expressed. As long as political institutions are arranged in such a way as to prevent one set of interests from becoming predominant, a mixed regime can last indefinitely, largely because the interest of the public as a whole is more likely to be served where the interests of the few and the many are in balance. If, however, one or the other set of interests manages to become dominant, then constitutional government slips into either pure oligarchy, in which only the interests of the wealthy are satisfied, or pure democracy, in which only the interests of the poor are satisfied. Both of these political forms are corruptions. They are both unjust and unstable. A mixed regime, by contrast, is stable in that it is a balance of private interests; but, at the same time, it is just in that it combines proper political rule (as much as that is practically possible) with rule of law.

The remainder of Aristotle's discussion of practical politics consists, first, in an analysis of why regimes change or fail and how to ensure that they do not; and, second, in a wide-ranging examination of governmental institutions. He considers the proper distribution of power among the executive, deliberative, and judicial branches; he looks at the function of the bureaucracy, what he calls the "system of offices"; and he speculates about tenure of office and the methods of appointment, keeping in mind that the object is to get officials who are loyal, competent, and just. In fact, he argues that this may be the most important practical problem, since the goodness and stability of the regime depends almost entirely on the extent to which public officials have these three characteristics.

In the end, Aristotle returns to the question of the good life and happiness. As he argued at the beginning, only in political life can these be achieved. But "political life" does not mean simply living in a polis. It means, rather, sharing in the honors and offices of the polis. Sharing in its proper sense involves understanding both how to rule and how to be ruled. This is not a matter of having political expertise. More important, it requires a well-ordered soul, one in which reason rules the appetites. The political association contributes to the development of such a soul in part by establishing a system of education designed to habituate individuals, and ultimately to teach them, to seek their proper human end and to find their happiness in the goods of the soul rather than the goods of the body. Since this is a system of moral education, Aristotle believes that the political order is based in ethics, and the study of politics is subordinate to the study of ethics. Aristotle's Politics, then, must be read in conjunction with his Nichomachean Ethics, for it is there that the nature of happiness and the human good is most thoroughly considered.

To the ears of those raised in contemporary democracy, some elements in Aristotle's political theory might sound discordant: in particular the principle of natural slavery, but also the emphasis on the priority of the community over the individual and the potentially intrusive and dangerous function of the polis. However, the value of Aristotle's Politics in a democratic world is precisely in sounding those discordant notes. It raises the possibility that democratic principles, accepted today as unquestioned goods, might be in need of substantive modification or, at the very least, some detailed defense in light of Aristotelian arguments against them. These arguments go beyond objections to how democracy works in practice. Aristotle's more substantive worry is that the practice of democracy, generally speaking, teaches citizens the wrong lessons about human nature. They tend to foster the belief that the individual is more important than the community, that freedom is more significant than virtue, and that human rationality is not decisive in determining the nature of politics. For Aristotle, the understanding of the human good in democracies-the communal beliefs-are antithetical to the formation of good men. In this environment, although it might be possible to be a good democratic citizen, it would be very difficult to be a good man. And, in spite of the emphasis on freedom (or, today, the "pursuit of happiness"), it would be very difficult to be a happy man. But in a political association that is organized around the principles of virtue, where the rule of reason over the appetites is somehow built into the political structure, and where greater value is placed on non-material aspects of human life, the possibility that individuals will have appropriate beliefs about what is good is increased, as is the likelihood that they will have a greater measure of happiness. Whether or not the attainment of this ideal is possible, in Aristotle's view political associations must organize themselves around these principles to the extent that they can. If they do not, human life will be little more than a sophisticated version of animal life. The function of the Politics, then, is not as a reactionary treatise advocating a reversion to aristocracy. Rather, it should be regarded as a recommendation to reconsider classical ideas about human nature and human happiness with a view to counteracting the imperfections of democracy.

Joseph Carrig holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Pennsylvania. He specializes in political theory and American government, and he writes frequently on the works of John Locke.