- Pub. Date:
- Cambridge University Press
This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian controla decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only for Japan but for the rest of the world.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Series:||Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.55(d)|
Table of Contents
List of tables and figure; Series editors' preface; Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. The collapse of oligarchy: failed attempts at cartel-maintenance; 3. Concession or facade: the Meiji constitution; 4. Electoral rules and party competition: the struggle for political survival; 5. The bureaucracy: who ruled whom?; 6. The courts: who monitored whom?; 7. The military: master of its own fate; 8. Financial politics; 9. Railroad politics; 10. Cotton politics; 11. Conclusion: institutions and political control; Notes; References; Index.