Practical Guilt; Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms / Edition 1

Practical Guilt; Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms / Edition 1

by Patricia S. Greenspan, Greenspan
Pub. Date:
Oxford University Press, USA

Paperback - Rent for

Select a Purchase Option (New Edition)
  • purchase options
    $63.82 $71.00 Save 10% Current price is $63.82, Original price is $71. You Save 10%.
  • purchase options


Practical Guilt; Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms / Edition 1

P.S. Greenspan uses the treatment of moral dilemmas as the basis for an alternative view of the structure of ethics and its relation to human psychology. Greenspan argues that dilemmas may be regarded as possible consequences of a set of social rules designed to be simple enough to be teachable. Where these rules prohibit action either way, the problematic motivational force of dilemmas can be explained by reference to the role of emotion as a substitute for action. Guilt is seen as a natural but contested candidate for the sort of emotional sanction for wrongdoing that might supply motivational force in dilemmas. It functions as a way of preserving virtue against moral luck. Greenspan defends guilt in the face of dilemmas on the basis of a "nonjudgmentalist" account of emotions that accepts guilt as appropriate even in some cases of unavoidable wrongdoing. In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a socially based version of moral realism. Since, on the proposed account, emotions underpin the teaching of moral language, human emotional capacities impose constraints on the nature of a viable moral code and thus affect the content of morality.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780195090901
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Publication date: 08/28/1994
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 264
Product dimensions: 6.25(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.66(d)

Table of Contents

I.Between the Horns
1.Defusing Dilemmas9
1.Moral Dilemmas and Motivational Force11
2.Motivating Moral "Ought,"23
2.Practical Oughts and Prohibitions29
1.Practical Oughts in Conflict30
2.Deontic Strength and Value41
3.Problems for Practical Ought-Systems52
3.Motivational Foundations of Conflict66
1.Moral Realism and Practical Phenomenology67
2.Internalist Dilemmas77
3.Between the Horns90
II.Sensibility and Standpoints
4.Moral Residues109
1.The Moral Significance of Guilt111
2.Guilt as an Identificatory Mechanism126
3.Contrary-to-Duty "Ought-to-Feel,"136
5.Unavoidable Guilt151
1.Subjective Guilt and Responsibility152
2.Perspectival Appropriateness166
3.Objective Guilt and Wrong176
6.Basing Ethics on Emotion187
1.The Motivational Model188
2.Sensibility and Standpoints198

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See All Customer Reviews