- Pub. Date:
- Cambridge University Press
This book challenges dominant theories of regulatory politics by placing presidential elections and national party leaders at the center of American regulatory state development. In the years between 1884 and 1936, the Democratic party abandoned its traditional regulatory agenda to enact the programs of voting blocs deemed pivotal to the consolidation of national party power. Coalition-building imperatives drove the decision-making calculus of Democratic leaders, prompting legislative intervention to secure outcomes consistent with national party needs. In the end, Democratic choices proved consequential for the character of the American regulatory state. The Democratic party turned its governing power to the build-up of national administrative power and the consolidation of corporate capitalism.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.87(d)|
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments; 1. Introduction: parties, presidential elections, and regulatory choice - a party system perspective; 2. Swing states, business Mugwumps, and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887; 3. The Progressive party vote and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914; 4. Progressive Republicans and the 'Death Sentence' for public utility holding companies during America's second New Deal; 5. Conclusion: parties and the American regulatory state; Bibliography; Index.