The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House

The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House

by Seymour M. Hersh


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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780671506889
Publisher: Touchstone
Publication date: 05/28/1984
Edition description: Reprint
Pages: 704
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.10(h) x 2.10(d)

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Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House 5 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 2 reviews.
carterchristian1 on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
An outstanding book about how Kissinger seized power, bypassing the Secretary of State Rogers, prolonged the Vietnam War after incursions into Cambodia, Laos, and was ultimately about to be dumped by Nixon when Watergate saved him. Kissinger remains a frequently interviewed and quoted senior authority during the Obama administration.In 2010 this should be considered a cautionary tale about prolonging and prolonging such a conflict as is happening now.
Guest More than 1 year ago
This account of the Nixon foreign policy is far better than Walter Isaacson¿s or Robert Dallek¿s. Hersh shows in detail how in July 1968 Nixon and Kissinger told President Thieu of South Vietnam to reject US calls to begin participating in peace talks. In doing so, they broke the US law against private citizens conducting diplomatic negotiations. Throughout 1968, Nixon campaigned on a platform of ending the war, yet then escalated the war. Nixon and Kissinger always opposed unilateral withdrawal. They aimed to continue the US aggression against Vietnam until victory could be achieved. When they talked of an `honourable settlement¿, they meant one that achieved all the USA¿s aggressive war aims. More US soldiers would have to die so that the earlier deaths would not have been in vain, which, absurdly, equates to saving the dead. Nixon and Kissinger cruelly indulged in sunshine talk about the war, promising the American people that one last push, one more invasion, would bring victory. But the truth was that the USA had lost. There was no alternative to withdrawal: their only choice was whether to end the war swiftly, or end it a bit later after killing yet more Vietnamese and having even more American soldiers killed pointlessly (20,000 were killed under Nixon). Nixon and Kissinger never grasped that a quick exit from Vietnam would have helped, not undermined, US credibility. They never asked other governments what they thought about a speedy exit. Détente was just a cynical device to try to divide Vietnam from its allies, and it failed. Nixon and Kissinger¿s policy towards Vietnam was a disaster, killing thousands of Americans, Vietnamese and Cambodians. They claimed that their policies were realistic and intelligent, but neither could see that the Vietnamese people were justly fighting for their national liberation. Nixon and Kissinger were not tragic, flawed heroes but despicable war criminals.