A wide-ranging survey of the theory and evidence on public goods, presenting the main literature on public goods, both theoretical and empirical, in a systematic manner. The breadth and depth of the book's coverage extends the existing literature in many ways.
|Publisher:||Springer Berlin Heidelberg|
|Edition description:||Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2005|
|Product dimensions:||6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.36(d)|
Table of Contents
Introduction.- First-Best Public Provision of Pure Public Goods.- Second-Best Public Provision of Pure Public Goods.- Determining Demand for Public Goods: Voting and Mechanisms.- Determining the Demand for Public Goods: Surveys and Indirect Estimation.- Privately Provided Public Goods.- Extensions.- Neutrality Results.- Empirical Evidence on Charitable Contributions.- Further Evidence on Privately Provided Public Goods.- Experimental Evidence on the Free Rider Problem.- The Effect of Public Inputs on the Economy in Static Models.- The Effect of Public Capital in Dynamic Models.- Empirical Work on the Public Capital Hypothesis.- Local Public Goods, Club Goods, and the Thiebout Hypothesis.- Fiscal Competition.- Empirical Testing with Local Public Goods.