When the United States invaded Iraq, President Bush made it clear: the U.S. was not fighting the Iraqi people. Rather, all quarrels were solely with Iraq's leadership. This kind of assertion remains frequent in foreign affairssanctions or military actions are imposed on a nation not because of its people, but because of its misguided leaders. Although the distinction might seem pedantic since the people suffer regardless, Punishing the Prince reveals how targeting individual leaders for punishment rather than the nations they represent creates incentives for cooperation between nations and leaves room for future relations with pariah states.
Punishing the Prince demonstrates that theories of leader punishment explain a great deal about international behavior and interstate relations. The book examines the impact that domestic political institutions have on whether citizens hold their leaders accountable for international commitments and shows that the degrees to which citizens are able to remove leaders shape the dynamics of interstate relations and leader turnover. Through analyses of sovereign debt, international trade, sanctions, and crisis bargaining, Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith also uncover striking differences in patterns of relations between democratic and autocratic states. Bringing together a vast body of information, Punishing the Prince offers new ways of thinking about international relations.
|Publisher:||Princeton University Press|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||5.90(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.70(d)|
About the Author
Fiona McGillivray is associate professor of politics at New York University and the author of Privileging Industry (Princeton). Alastair Smith is professor of politics at New York University and the author of Election Timing.
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations ixList of Tables xiPreface xiii
Chapter 1: We Have No Quarrel with the People 1Leader Specifi c Punishments and Interstate Relations 3Proper Nouns in International Relations 12International Cooperation 15
Chapter 2: A Theory of Leader Specifi c Punishments 31A Stochastic Prisoners’ Dilemma with Leader Mortality 33A Continuous Choice Prisoners’ Dilemma 50Appendix 65
Chapter 3: Political Institutions, Policy Variability, and the Survival of Leaders 77Leader Survival 77Selectorate Politics 79Selectorate Institutions, Policy Choice, and Leader Survival 80Policy Variability and the Turnover of Leaders 83
Chapter 4: Leader Specifi c Strategies in Human Subject Experiments 89Human Subject Experiments 90Results 93Conclusions 101
Chapter 5: International Trade, Institutions, and Leader Change 109Data 111Setup of Econometric Tests and Model Specifi cation 115Results 119Conclusions 140
Chapter 6: Putting the Sovereign Back into Sovereign Debt 142Institutions, Credibility, and Explanations of Debt 143Modeling the Debt Repayment 145Data 154Debt, Repayment, and Leader Replacement 157Conclusions 172
Chapter 7: Confl ictual Interactions 173International Crises 173Economic Sanctions 182
Chapter 8: Positive Political Theory and Policy 190Building Trust and Cooperation 190Positive Political Theory or Policy Advice? 192Conclusions 199
Bibliography 201Index 217
What People are Saying About This
International relations theorists have long understood that treating states as rational, unitary actors is at best a useful first approximation. The challenge has been figuring out how to relax this assumption in fruitful ways that avoid theoretical chaos. Full of interesting insights and ideas, Punishing the Prince is an important contribution to opening up the black box.
Robert Powell, University of California, Berkeley
Wide-ranging and rigorously argued, this is a powerful and informative book.
Bruce Russett, Yale University
McGillivray and Smith present a powerful, insightful, and intuitively appealing idea with important implications for international relations.
Hein Goemans, Rochester University
McGillivray and Smith develop a novel theory of international cooperation that places the incentives of state leaders front and center. They skillfully combine formal methods with experimental and quantitative evidence to show that the fate of leaders and the prospects for interstate cooperation are inextricably linked. Given its important insights into issues of credible commitment, reputation, signaling, and domestic political influences on foreign policy, this book should have wide-ranging influence.
Kenneth Schultz, Stanford University