Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification

by Robert J. Fogelin

Overview

This work, written from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, is an examination of contemporary theories of knowledge and justification. It takes ideas primarily found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism, restates them in a modern idiom, and then asks whether any contemporary theory of knowledge meets the challenges they raise. The first part, entitled "Gettier and the Problem of Knowledge," attempts to rescue our ordinary concept of knowledge from those philosophers who have assigned burdens to it that it cannot bear. Properly understood, Fogelin shows that the concept of knowledge is unproblematic. The second part of this study, called "Agrippa and the Problem of Justification," examines Agrippa's contribution to Pyrrhonism, a systematic reduction of its procedures which came to be known as the "Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief." These modes present a completely general procedure for refuting any claim a dogmatist might make. Though largely unnoticed, there is, according to Fogelin, an uncanny resemblance between problems posed by Agrippa's "Five Modes" and those that contemporary epistemologists address under the heading of a theory of justification. Fogelin examines the strongest contemporary theories of justification—in both foundationalist and anti-foundationalist forms. The conclusion is that recent philosophical writings on justification have made no significant progress in responding to the Pyrrhonian problems these writings have addressed.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780195089875
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	09/22/1994
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	256
Product dimensions:	6.31(w) x 9.56(h) x 0.97(d)

Table of Contents

	Introduction: Philosophical Skepticism and Pyrrhonism	3
Part I	Gettier and the Problem of Knowledge
Chapter 1.	Gettier Problems	15
	Gettier's Formulation	15
	Gettier's Reasons for Accepting His First Point	16
	Gettier's Understanding of Justification	17
	A Second Interpretation of Justification	18
	The Gettier Problems and Nonmonotonicity	21
	Variations on the Gettier Problems	23
	Epistemic Responsibility	26
	Conclusion	28
Chapter 2.	Fourth-Clause Theories	31
	Analyses of Knowledge	31
	Indefeasibility Theories	33
Chapter 3.	Externalism	41
	The Attraction of Externalism	42
	BonJour against the Reliabilists	43
	Externalist Grounds	46
	Goldman and Causal Theories of Knowing	49
	The Move to the Subjunctive	54
Chapter 4.	Subjunctivism and Subjunctivitis	61
	Conclusive Reasons	61
	Subjunctivism	66
	Subjunctivitis	70
	Subjunctive Conditionals and Possible Worlds	72
	Nozick against the "Skeptics,"	75
	The Failure of Epistemic Closure	79
	Nozick against the Skeptics	81
	Dretske against Epistemic Closure	82
Chapter 5.	Epistemic Grace	88
	Justificatory Procedures	89
	Doubts	90
	Levels of Scrutiny	93
	Is There a Fact of the Matter in Knowing?	95
	It's Hard to Say	98
	Summary of Part I	99
Appendix A.	The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox	102
	The Lottery Paradox	102
	The Preface Paradox	105
	The Conjunction Principle for Knowledge	108
Part II	Agrippa and the Problem of Justification
Chapter 6.	Agrippa and the Problem of Epistemic Justification	113
	The Problem	114
	Success Conditions on Theories of Justification	117
	Theories of Epistemic Justification	119
Chapter 7.	Foundationalism	123
	Forms of Foundationalism	123
	Chisholm's Version of Foundationalism	124
	Levels of Justification	125
	Certainty and the Self-Presenting	129
	Presumptions	132
	The Transfer of Justification	134
	Material Epistemic Principles	135
	Summary and Evaluation	138
Chapter 8.	Internal Coherentism	146
	BonJour's Version of Coherentism	147
	Standards of Coherence	148
	Immediate Problems	149
	The Doxastic Presumption	152
	Standard Objections to Coherentism	154
	Coherence and Observation	155
	The Multiple-Choice Problem	158
	Justification and Truth	159
	An Assessment	162
	Lehrer and the Isolation Objection	162
Chapter 9.	External Coherentism	170
	Davidson's Version of Coherentism	171
	The Nature of Coherence	172
	Truth	173
	The Skeptical Challenge	174
	Sensation and Belief	175
	Meaning and Justification	176
	The Fundamental Argument	176
	The Golden Triangle	182
	Davidson's Externalist Semantics	183
	The Problem of Error	184
	The Cartesian Skeptic's Reply	186
	The Pyrrhonian Skeptic's Reply	188
Chapter 10.	Pyrrhonism	192
	Neo-Pyrrhonism	192
	Again, Is There a Fact of the Matter in Knowing?	193
	The Pyrrhonist's Use of Epistemic Terms	195
	Is Skepticism Statable?	196
	A Temporary Stopping Point	202
Appendix B.	Two Wittgensteins	205
	Turning Things Around	206
	Holism	208
	Publicity	211
	Action	215
	References	223
	Index	231

Editorial Reviews

"Many of Fogelin's criticisms of other views are undeniably interesting and incisive."—Times Literary Supplement

"Fogelin expertly cuts through volumes of details and qualifications so as to bring to life some of contemporary epistemology's most important problems and proposals. But the book is by no means valuable only as an introduction. Epistemologists will find Fogelin's characterizations and critiques of the field enlightening and his updated Pyrrhonism challenging."—nternational Philosophical Quarterly

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