Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. Professor Huber investigates the decision by French elites to include in the Constitution legislative procedures aimed to rationalize the policy-making role of parliament and analyzes the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability, and political accountability. Through its use of theories developed in the American politics literature, the study reveals important similarities between legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary systems and shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French institutional arrangements.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Series:||Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||5.90(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.60(d)|
Table of Contents
Introduction; 1. Parliamentary government in the Fifth Republic; 2. Choosing institutions; 3. Restrictive procedures and policy conflict; 4. Restrictive procedures and bargaining among parties; 5. The confidence vote procedure and electoral politics; 6. Electoral politics, procedural choice, and the French budget; 7. Institutional arrangements, political parties, and parliamentary democracy.