Rules of apportionment are vital elements of every social, political, and legal order. In marriages and families, in business partnerships and social organizations, and in governments and supranational relationships, rules of apportionment affect not only how collective decisions are made and by whom, but also how and why a particular constitutional order develops over time. Recreating the American Republic provides a first and far-reaching analysis of when, how, and why these rules change and with what constitutional consequences. Recreating the American Republic reveals the special import of apportionment rules for pluralistic, democratic orders by engaging three critical eras and events of American history: the colonial era and the American Revolution; the early national years and the 1787 Constitutional Convention; and the nineteenth century and the American Civil War. This study revisits and systematically compares each seemingly familiar era and eventrevealing new insights about each and a new metanarrative of American political development from 1700 to 1870. Recreating the American Republic will engage and challenge scholars and students of American history; political scientists and sociologists working within the analytical narrative, comparative, and historical-institutionalist methodological traditions; and political and legal theorists intrigued by questions of history, human order, consensual constitutionalism, the agency-structure antinomy, institutional change and representative governance.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.98(d)|
Table of Contents
1. Introduction; 2. Raising leviathan: British-American relations, 1700-1774; 3. Our emperors have no clothes: the macro-micro synthesis and the American Revolution; 4. Union over multiplicity: a bond of words, a confederation in speech, and the constitutional rule of equal state apportionment; 5. Contours of the confederation: macro-level conditions, 1776-1786; 6. Divide et impera: constitutional heresthetics and the breaking of the articles; 7. The veil of representational certainty: the 1787 constitutional convention; 8. The relational republic: macro-level conditions, 1790-1860; 9. Between consent and coercion: libido dominandum and the end of representation; 10. Conclusions.