Although neoliberals have billed it as a panacea, deregulation expands the possible divergences between public and private interests and thus, according to Rossi (Florida State U. College of Law), requires a reevaluation of the traditional public law doctrines that define the rules in competitive markets. He uses a case study of electric power deregulation to draw general lessons within a framework of an "incomplete contracts" government relations bargaining approach that isolates incentives and welfare states associated with contract renegotiation. Among the doctrines of regulatory law that are examined utilizing this approach are customer service obligations, the takings clause as a constraint on regulators, the filed tariff doctrine as a mechanism for limiting ex post judicial enforcement, the dormant commerce clause and state action immunity from antitrust enforcement, and regulatory federalism. Annotation ©2005 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 1.10(d)|
Table of Contents
1. The scope of regulatory bargaining; Part I. Extending Incomplete Bargains from the Economics of the Firm to Public Governance: 2. Regulatory bargains and the stability of natural monopoly regulation; 3. The incompleteness of regulatory law: moving beyond the 'small world' of natural monopoly regulation; 4. Refin(anc)ing service obligations for a competitive environment; Part II. Incomplete Regulatory Bargains, Institutions, and the Role of Judicial Review in Deregulated Industries: 5. Deregulatory takings, incomplete regulatory bargains, and judicial review; 6. Incomplete regulatory tariffs and the role of courts; 7. Bargaining for state-assisted monopoly; 8. Overcoming bargaining failures in a federalist system; 9. Incomplete regulatory bargaining and the lessons for judicial review.