Russia’s emergence as a Great Power in the eighteenth century is usually attributed to Peter I’s radical programme of ‘Westernising’ reforms. But the Russian military did not simply copy European armies. Adapting the tactics of its neighbours on both sides, Russia created a powerful strategy of its own, integrating steppe defence with European concerns. In Russia’s Wars of Emergence, Carol Belkin Stevens examines the social and political factors underpinning Muscovite military history, the eventual success of the Russian Empire and the sacrifices made for power.
About the Author
Carol Belkin Stevens is an Associate Professor at Colgate University, Hamilton, New York, specialising in early modern Russia. She is the author of Soldiers on the Steppe (1996) and has been published in numerous journals including Russian History.
Table of Contents
PART I 1450-1598
- The constituents for Muscovite power, c.1450
- Creating a Muscovite army, 1462-1533
- The army that won an empire
PART II 1598-1697
- The political prelude to military reform
- The Thirteen Years’ War, 1654-67
- The steppe frontier after Razzin, 1672-97
PART III 1698-1730
- Peter the Great and the beginning of the Great Northern War
- Military instiutionalization after Poltava
Conclusion: Russiawithout Peter