This monograph investigates the artillery organization of the heavy division to determine whether the current direct support artillery battalion should become organic to the maneuver brigade. The nature of the current battlefield as expressed in FM 100-5 may require a change from our traditiona1 methods of providing field artillery support to the maneuver brigade. Initially this paper develops the requirements for adequate, flexible and continuous field artillery support for both the maneuver brigade and the division. Insights are obtained through the analysis of the United States experience during WWII, the Soviet use of forward detachments during WWII and the Israeli experiences during the 1973 War. Each historical example is evaluated in terms of the artillery organization's ability to provide adequate, flexible and continuous field artillery fires in support of the maneuver force. This study concludes that the current field artillery organization of the heavy division provides adequate, flexible and continuous fires in support of both the maneuver brigade and the division. This conclusion is based on the assumption that current doctrine continues to identify the division as the lowest tactical unit of maneuver. However, if doctrine establishes the brigade as the lowest tactical unit of maneuver, then the artillery must become organic at that level.
