First published in 1971, Social Choice is both a text and reference containing the proceedings of a conference dealing with contemporary work on the normative and descriptive aspects of the social choice problem. This reissue will be of interest to advanced undergraduate and graduate courses on group decision making and social choice. Economists, social psychologists, political scientists and sociologists will welcome this valuable work.
Table of Contents
Part 1: Defining The Problem 1. Combining Individual Preferences into a Social Choice 2. Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions Part 2: Descriptive Studies 3. Negotiations and Decisions in a Politics game 4. Coalition Formation and Change 5. An Experimental Examination of Formal and Informal Rules of a Three-person Game 6. Coalition Behaviour in Inessential Games 7. Bargaining Behaviour in an Asymmetric Triad 8. A level of Aspiration Model for Group Decision Making 9. A Utility Theory for the Behaviour of Three-person Interaction Systems 10. An Experimental Study of Three Voting Rules 11. Choosing Among Alternative Distributions of Rewards 12. Control of Collectivities and the Power of a Collective to act 13. Individual Preferences, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare Part 3: Normative Studies 14. Some Extensions to a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice 15. Some Types of Party Competition and their Function in Social Choice 16. An Estimate for the Decisiveness of Election Outcomes 17. A Game-theoretic Analysis of Social Choice 18. A Game-theoretic Analysis of Party Platform Selection.