Strategic Learning and Its Limits

by H. Peyton Young

Overview

In this book a distinguished economist suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in current economics. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780199269181
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	01/13/2005
Series:	Ryde Lectures
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	176
Product dimensions:	8.56(w) x 6.49(h) x 0.66(d)

About the Author

H. Peyton Young is Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University and a Professorial Fellow of Nuffield College Oxford. He is also Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the Center on Social and Economic Dynamics at the Brookings Institution, Executive Vice President of the Game Theory Society, and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. His areas of research include cooperative and noncooperative game theory, the design of legislative systems, and the analysis of distributive justice.

Table of Contents

1. The Interactive Learning Problem2. Reinforcement and Regret3. Equilibrium4. Conditional No-Regret Learning5. Prediction, Postdiction, and Calibration6. Fictitious Play and Its Variants7. Bayesian Learning8. Hypothesis Testing9. Conclusion