The "Syrian crisis" of 1957, sparked by a covert attempt by the Eisenhower administration to overthrow what it perceived to be an emerging Soviet client state in the Middle East, represented the denouement of a badly misguided U.S. foreign policy, according to David Lesch. The repercussions of this incident, which almost precipitated a superpower c
|Publisher:||Taylor & Francis|
|Sold by:||Barnes & Noble|
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About the Author
David Lesch is assistant professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio.
Table of ContentsPreface -- Note on the Text -- Introduction -- American Policy Under Truman -- Eisenhower’s Turn -- The Swinging of the Pendulum in Syria -- Syria’s Choice -- Policy Fragmentation -- Prelude to the 1957 Crisis -- Syria’s Rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and Iraq -- The American Riposte -- Regional Diplomacy of Sa’ud and Nasser -- The International Crisis -- Conclusion